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JANUS PHILOSOPHY 
 
The  ability  to  see  past  and  present  simultaneously  must  be  of  prime 
importance in any development scenario. This speaks to the essence of the 
Janus Development Strategy, whose philosophy is outlined below. 
 
Janus  is  the  Roman  god  of  gates  and  doors  (ianua),  beginnings  and 
endings, and hence represented with a double-faced head, each looking in 
opposite  directions.  He  was  worshipped  at  the  beginning  of  the  harvest 
time, planting, marriage, birth, and other types of beginnings, especially 
the beginnings of important events in a person’s life. Janus also represents 
the  transition  between  primitive  life  and  civilization,  between  the 
countryside  and  the  city,  peace  and  war,  and  the  growing-up  of  young 
people.  
One  tradition  states  that  he  came  from  Thessaly  and  that  he  was 
welcomed  by  Camese  in  Latium,  where  they  shared  a  kingdom.  They 
married  and  had  several  children,  among  which  the  river  god  Tiberinus 
(after whom the river Tiber is named). When his wife died, Janus became 
the sole ruler of Latium. He sheltered Saturn when he was fleeing from 
Jupiter. Janus, as the first king of Latium, brought the people a time of 
peace and welfare; the Golden Age. He introduced money, cultivation of 
the fields, and the laws. After his death he was deified and became the 
protector  of  Rome.  When  Romulus  and  his  associates  stole  the  Sabine 
Virgins, the Sabines attacked the city. The daughter of one of the guards 
on  the  Capitolian  Hill  betrayed  her  fellow  countrymen  and  guided  the 
enemy into the city. They attempted to climb the hill but Janus made a hot 
spring erupt from the ground, and the would-be attackers fled from the 
city. Ever since, the gates of his temple were kept open in times of war so    11 
the god would be ready to intervene when necessary. In times of peace 
the gates were closed.  
His most famous sanctuary was a portal on the Forum Romanum through 
which the Roman legionaries went to war. He also had a temple on the 
Forum Olitorium, and in the first century another temple was built on the 
Forum of Nerva. This one had four portals, called Janus Quadrifons. When 
Rome became a republic, only one of the royal functions survived, namely 
that of rex sacrorum or rex sacrificulus. His priests regularly sacrificed to 
him. The month of January (the eleventh Roman month) is named after 
him.  
Janus  was  represented  with  two  faces,  originally  one  face  was  bearded 
while the other was not (probably  a symbol of the sun and the moon). 
Later both faces were bearded. In his right hand he holds a key.  
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Jamaican Fiscal Policy Under Accrual Budgeting 
 
￿￿The government intends to advance reforms in the public expenditure management 
system over the medium term. The plan for the current year is to extend modernization 
measures  implemented in the pilot ministries to the rest of the central government. 
These  measures  aim  at  establishing  output-based  budgeting,  and  linking  salary 
increases to performance by the end of this fiscal year, and moving toward accrual 
accounting  over  a  three-year  period.  In  addition,  the  authorities  plan  further  to 
strengthen the cash management system.￿ 
(Jamaica: 2004 Article IV Consultation, Pg. 13 section 21) 
 
Overview 
The Government of Jamaica is in the process of a phased shift from cash to 
full accrual budgeting.  Historically cash accounting, with its embodiment in 
domestic  legislation  and  international  guidelines,  has  underpinned  the 
production of public accounts.  In recent times, however, the Government 
has  given  greater  attention  to  developing  more  business-like  reporting 
within the public sector.  These changes do not affect the Government￿s 
fiscal  objectives  or  strategy,  but  they  do  require  some  changes  in 
measurement and terminology. 
The  move  from  cash  to  accrual  budgeting  is  an  important  step  in  the 
Government￿s reform program to develop more business-like reporting for 
the  public  sector  that  accounts  for  the  full  cost  of  service  delivery  and 
incorporates a ￿whole of government￿ approach. 
The fundamental distinction between the two forms of accounting centers 
on  timing      cash  accounting  records  the  transaction  when  cash  is 
exchanged, whereas accrual indicators record a financial flow at the time   13 
economic  value  is  created,  transformed,  exchanged,  transferred  or 
extinguished, whether or not cash is exchanged at the time.  In practice, 
this means that non-cash items such as accruing superannuation liabilities 
and depreciation will now be regularly incorporated in the production of 
public accounts. 
The transition  to an accrual accounting framework does not change the 
objectives of fiscal policy.  It will, however, be necessary to express the 
fiscal  strategy  and  associated  targets  in  accrual  budgeting  terms.    The 
Government  is  pursuing  a  medium-term  fiscal  objective  of  achieving 
underlying cash balance on average over the economic cycle.  Following 
the introduction of accrual accounting, the Government will aim to achieve 
fiscal balance  the accrual counterpart of the underlying cash balance  
on average over the economic cycle.  The fiscal balance, like the underlying 
cash balance, measures the Government￿s contribution to net lending (the 
national investment-saving imbalance) and hence to the external current 
account balance.  The fiscal balance is an aggregate in the Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) operating statement.  It can also be derived from 
an  accounting  standard  operating  result  by  making  two  adjustments  for 
economic revaluations and capital. 
The main advantage of accrual measures (as opposed to cash) is that they 
provide  a  more  comprehensive  indication  of  the  total  activity  of 
Government and the long-term effects of current policy.  Cash measures 
do, however, have some advantages for tracking expenditures in a fiscal 
year and  helping to identify the short-term effect of fiscal policy on the 
economy.    Consequently,  cash  indicators  for  the  headline  and  the 
underlying balance will continue to be produced.   
The  move  to  accrual  budgeting  will  result  in  several  presentational 
changes.  First, budget reporting will adopt a consolidated framework by   14 
shifting from budget sector to general government reporting.  Second, as 
part  of  the  Budget  process,  consistent  with  both  accounting  and 
Government Finance Statistic and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
requirements,  the  Government  will  produce  a  complete  set  of  accrual 
statements, including: 
  an operating statement; 
  a statement of assets and liabilities; and 
  a statement of cash flows. 
 
Thirdly, to promote greater efficiency in the management of its assets, the 
Government will produce a capital budget statement that will account for 
all capital expenditure and funding.  
Taken  together,  this  series  of  reforms  should  contribute  towards  more 
transparent and informative public accounts and greater efficiency in the 
management of public resources. 
While the fiscal balance is the accrual counterpart of the underlying cash 
balance, there will be differences as to when transactions are recorded on 
an accrual and a cash basis, with the result that the fiscal balance may 
differ from the underlying cash balance in a given period.  Some company 
tax  liabilities  will  be  brought  forward  with  the  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG) 
arrangements but certain tax installments (cash payments) will be deferred 
and  paid  in  latter  years.    The  bringing  forward  of  tax  liabilities  will  be 
reflected  in  accrual  revenues  ,  but  they  will  not  be  recorded  in  cash 
revenues until the tax installments are paid.  These timing differences will 
result in a sizeable divergence between the fiscal balance and underlying 
cash balance.   15 
While unrelated to the movement to an accrual budget, another important 
change in the Budget is the treatment of Public Trading Enterprises (PTEs) 
superannuation  liabilities.    The  Government  still  makes  superannuation 
payments  to  current  and  former  employees  of  PTEs  who  were  once 
employees within the general government sector.  These payments, have 
previously been treated as financing transactions and have therefore had 
no  impact  on  the  budget  cash  balances.    However,  consistent  with  
changes  to  the  National  Accounts  in  line  with  international  statistical 
standards, onwards, these payments will be effectively treated as budget 
outlays with the result that they will be recorded in (reduce) the underlying 
and headline cash balances. 
 
Major  differences  between  cash  accounting  and  accrual 
accounting 
Timing of transactions 
 
Under a cash system, transactions are recorded in the reporting period in 
which cash changes hands.  An accrual system records transactions in the 
period  in  which  income  is  earned  or  expenses  incurred,  subject  to  the 
important caveat that the transactions are able to be reliably measured at 
that  time.    Effectively,  assets,  liabilities,  revenues  and  expenses  arising 
from  transactions  or  other  events  must  be  recognised  in  the  financial 
statements  when  they  have  an  economic  impact  on  the  government, 
regardless of when the associated cash flows occur. 
When  applied  to  the  Government,  accrual  reporting  will  cover  some 
significant  financial  items  that  are  not  included  in  cash-based  statistics 
because they do not have an associated cash flow.  The major differences 
between cash budgeting and the accrual framework are outlined below.   16 
Superannuation 
 
Accrual  budgeting  will  record  the  accruing  superannuation  expense 
whether the liability is funded or unfunded.  The superannuation expense 
in the operating statement, in a given year, is equal to the superannuation 
accruing  to  current  employees  as  well  as  the  interest  or  growth  on  the 
outstanding  liability.    In  calculating  changes  in  the  stock  of  unfunded 
superannuation  liabilities,  the  actuary  takes  into  account  the  number  of 
salary earners and assumptions relating to wages growth, inflation and the 
expected rate of return on investment. 
Public debt interest (PDI) 
 
Under  cash  accounting,  PDI  is  recorded  as  the  interest  paid  during  the 
year.    Under  an  accrual  approach,  allowance  is  also  made  for  interest 
accrued, but not actually paid, during the period. 
A further difference between cash and accrual accounting for PDI concerns 




The preparation of accrual estimates requires a conceptually consistent and 
reliable  method  of  recognising  when  taxation  revenue  accrues  to  the 
Government. 
The  Government  could  record  an  accrual  of  revenue  at  the  time  that 
economic transactions, resulting in a taxation liability, took place.  It is very 
difficult, however, to know when all such transactions take place.  As a 
result, at this stage revenue will be recognised as accruing at the time the 
relevant tax law indicates the existence of a requirement to pay an amount   17 
in tax or when a tax liability assessment is raised That is, revenue is only 
recognised  when  the  taxpayer  makes  a  self-assessment  or  the  Tax 
authorities issues an assessment. 
In effect only two changes to current cash estimates are required.  These 
are adjustments for receivables, and for bad and doubtful debts. 
1. The  adjustment  for  receivables  recognises  revenue  for  which  an 
assessment has been issued but which has not yet been received and 
excludes  cash  received  which  has  already  been  accounted  for  in 
receivables (because it accrued in a previous reporting period). 
2. The adjustment for bad and doubtful debts allows for the fact that 
some accounts receivable are never paid and are eventually written 
off.  At the end of each financial year tax receivables that are likely to 
become uncollectable are brought to account and expensed to the 
year just finishing.  In this way expenses are matched to the period 
in which they were incurred. 
Capital 
 
Accrual  accounting  records  capital  use  (depreciation)  in  the  operating 
statement,  whereas  cash  accounting  records  capital  expenditure.  
However, the Government￿s primary fiscal target  fiscal balance  will 
continue  to  record  capital  expenditure  instead  of  depreciation.    This 
treatment is necessary because the fiscal balance is intended to measure 
net lending, or the difference between saving and investment expenditure.  
Therefore the fiscal balance detects the cash ￿investment￿ in a given year, 
not the capital  used.  The cash  flow statement  will outline most capital 
expenditure in purchase of property, plant and equipment, and intangibles 
while total capital expenditure will be published in the Government￿s capital 
budget statement.   18 
 
Note To Political Representatives 
 
Politicians (Members Of Parliament and Senators) the 81 members of the 
House  will  have  to  be  put  through  extensive  and  intensive  seminars  to 
facilitate continued effective representation to the people with regards to 
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Can Higher Reserves Help Reduce Exchange Rate 
Volatility in Jamaica? 
Overview 
 
Does holding higher reserves reduce the volatility of the real exchange rate 
independently of the influence of the choice of exchange rate regime or of 
the role of foreign exchange intervention? 
 
The literature has focused mainly on two classes of benefits arising from a 
high level of reserves as follows: 
1. A  high  level  of  reserve  adequacy  has  been  shown  to  reduce  the 
likelihood  of  currency  crises  that  is,  a  sudden  unwillingness  by 
international lenders to renew their credit lines at times of market 
uncertainty. 
2. A second beneficial effect is that higher reserve adequacy tends to be 
associated  with  lower  external  borrowing  costs.  This  effect  works 
both  directly  through  improved  confidence  and  indirectly  through 
improved credit ratings on sovereign foreign currency debt, since the 
government￿s  default  risk  is  perceived  to  diminish  with  higher 
reserves. 
Determinants Of The Volatility Of The Exchange Rate 
 
The literature on the determinants of the volatility of the exchange rate has 
reached a number of conclusions:   20 
1. Much more volatility of exchange rates than can be explained by the 
volatility  of  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  even  in  models  that 
assume sticky prices, sluggish money adjustment, and time-varying 
risk premia. 
2. Country differences in exchange rate volatility appear to be linked to 
a  set  of  macroeconomic  variables,  as  well  as  capital  control 
measures, foreign exchange regime, and market structure. 
3. Balance sheet factors matter; these include the size of external debt 
and domestic market liquidity, as well as country size and level of 
development. In particular, the choice of exchange rate regime can 
reduce currency volatility, given that prices are normally stickier than 
the exchange rate 
Testing For The Determinants Of Nominal Exchange Rate 
Volatility 
Canales-Kriljenko and Habermeier (1999) testing for the determinants of 
nominal exchange rate volatility on a cross-section of 85 developing and 
transition economies; using a cross-section regression permitted the 
inclusion of a very large set of structural variables with little or no time 
variation, such as, de jure exchange rate regime, and a set of measure 
Of exchange restrictions. On the basis of a model selection algorithm, they 
find  that  the  most  important  macroeconomic  determinants  of  nominal 
exchange rate volatility were:  
1. Inflation,  
2. Real GDP growth,  
3. Fiscal deficit (in percent of GDP),  
4. And trade openness.    21 
Surprisingly, no measure of reserve adequacy was chosen by the model 
selection algorithm and none were, therefore, retained in the model. 
 
Points For Jamaican Parliamentarians To Note 
 
Ketil  Hviding,  Michael  Nowak,  and  Luca  Antonio  Ricci  (2004)  draw  the 
following conclusions on the issue: 
1. If  the  average  developing  country  halved  its  ratio  of  reserves  to 
short-term  debt,  it  could  experience  an  increase  in  exchange  rate 
volatility of up to 20 percent. 
 
2. In  terms  of  the  channel  through  which  this  effect  operates,  only 
tentative conclusions can be made at this stage. The effect does not 
appear to operate via the use of reserves to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market, but rather through signaling a greater potential for 
foreign  exchange  intervention  in  a  crisis  situation  or  a  generally 
increased comfort level. Further research would be needed to identify 
the channels through which  the  higher reserve levels are working. 
For example, a proxy for exchange market intervention that better 
captures  policy  intentions  could  provide  further  insights  into  this 
important issue. 
 
3. Other policy actions may, however, be at least as powerful as reserve 
accumulation in reducing real exchange rate volatility. In particular, 
monetary  volatility  and  external  debt  seem  to  be  powerful 
determinants  of  real  exchange  rate  volatility,  suggesting  that  a 
credible  and  stability-oriented  monetary  policy  combined  with   22 
external  debt  management  would  be  important  elements  of  any 
policy  package  aimed  at  reducing  unwanted  real  exchange  rate 
volatility. 
 
Citizen Auditors: Taxpayers Should Take Responsibility 
For Overseeing How Their Municipalities Spend Money. 
Overview 
 
Not  long  ago,  residents  in  a  neighbourhood  in  BogotÆ,  Colombia,  were 
pleased to see crews arrive to pave their streets. But their pleasure turned 
to alarm when they discovered that the construction company had decided 
to cut costs by using a layer of sand under the asphalt, which would have 
resulted  in  a  much  less  durable  surface.  The  residents  immediately 
contacted  the  Veedur￿a  Distrital,  an  advisory  agency  of  the  city  that 
handles  the  citizen￿s  participation  in  municipal  affairs,  which  in  turn 
reported  the  incident  to  the  city￿s  Urban  Development  Institute.  The 
institute contacted the construction company and told them: either stick to 
the original plans, or you will be taken to court. 
How did the neighbors know what type of material was supposed to be 
used  for  the  filling?  What  made  them  think  that  their  report  would  be 
effective? 
 
Participation and control 
 
The  1991  Colombian  Constitution  opened  enormous  possibilities  for  the 
involvement of civil society in public life; Our Local Government  Reform   23 
Programme is moving in that direction but the progress is slow. As a result, 
the Veedur￿a Nacional and several Veedur￿as Distritales were established. 
Veedur￿a  Distrital  has  a  twofold  purpose:  1)  to  oversee  that  the  cities￿ 
procedures are effective 2) to organize the citizens in their new task as 
monitors. 
The immediate objective is to mobilize this army of monitors. The Veedur￿a 
is  promoting  its  own  visibility  and  organizing  meetings  throughout  the 
districts to help train citizens. Anyone can join as a volunteer as long as he 
or  she  shows  the  commitment  to  participate  and  participates  in  the 
training. 
The agency plans to open information centers at strategic locations with 
easy access where people who volunteer to participate in this program can 
go to join, be trained and get information about the projects that could 




Any citizen can find out if a public institution in his district or elsewhere 
overspent for articles or services, from the most important and expensive 
to the most trivial or inexpensive: stationery, computers, printers, vehicles, 
hospital equipment, pencils, almost anything. It is also possible to compare 
those  prices  with  what  other  institutions  paid  for  identical  articles  and 
services,  or  with  the  list  of  ￿recommended  prices￿  that  the  Veedur￿a 
provides as a result of its own market research. 
All this information is  available in the Bulletins of Prices for the District, 
which are published and distributed periodically by the Veedur￿a, and in 
BogotÆ Transparente, a magazine of the same agency. These publications   24 
have had enormous success and have forced the local agencies to carefully 
examine their practices. The Veedur￿a also publishes bulletins with detailed 




The city helps to prevent corruption by signing transparency agreements 
with  construction  companies,  auditors  and  evaluation  committees  to 
prevent and deter bad practices. As for internal transparency, the Veedur￿a 
can undertake investigations against public officials. An agreement with the 
office  of  the  Public  Prosecutor  and  with  the  Department  of  Security 
Administration allows initiating judicial procedures, 
Citizen￿s  Meetings  are  another  part  of  this  strategy  to  promote 
transparency.  They give opportunities for residents  to discuss  and help 
plan  local  development  strategies  for  the  following  four  years.  The 
Municipality of BogotÆ also holds a series of public hearings to report on 
the  city￿s  budget  that  are  usually  broadcast  live  by  the  local  television 
stations. 
 
Can we in Jamaica learn anything from this positive Colombian experience? 
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It is clear that politics influences economic policy. Determining the extent 
to  which  this  happens  is  quite  a  challenge,  particularly  for  researchers 
studying developing countries. 
It is  a challenge worth meeting, however, because failing  to design the 
appropriate  policy may  have  a major negative impact on  the  welfare of 
these societies. 
An example of a policy with a high political dimension and strong welfare 
impact is the choice of nominal anchor to stabilize inflation. In response to 
high  and  chronic  inflation,  many  countries  have  adopted  stabilization 
policies.  These  policies  differ  in  their  design,  but  to  what  extent  these 
differences arise from political, rather than economic, motives is not clear. 
Nor is it known whether and to what extent policymakers take advantage 
of the consumption cycles derived from the different stabilization strategies 
in order to further their political career. 
ERBS vs. MBS 
 
There  are  basically  two  possible  anchors  available  for  policymakers  to 
stabilize  inflation:  the  exchange  rate  and  a  monetary  aggregate.  These 
alternatives lead to two different consumption paths even if to the same 
end  result  in  terms  of  welfare.  Exchange  rate-  based  stabilization 
programs generate an initial consumption boom and later a recession in 
the  economy  whereas  money-based  stabilizations  generate  an  early 
consumption bust followed by a recovery. A benevolent dictator might be   26 
indifferent  to  the  differences  between  both  strategies  but  elected 
officials must be sensitive to the reaction of voters. 
If  voters  are  not  perfectly  forward  looking,  then  the  timing  of  elections 
might  matter,  and  knowledge  of  these  consumption  patterns  allow 
politicians to use both nominal anchors opportunistically. In particular, an 
opportunistic politician might use exchange-rate-based stabilizations 
prior to elections whereas monetary anchors might be employed after 
elections. 
Timing  Of  Elections  Affect  The  Choice  Of  Anchor  For 
Stabilization 
Research out of the International Monetary fund using results derived from fairly 
simple econometric  models  using data on  34  full-fledged stabilization episodes 
clearly  indicate  that  the  timing  of  elections  affect  the  choice  of  anchor  for 
stabilization. In particular, policymakers assess how distant the next elections are 
before making their choice of nominal anchor in the inflation stabilization program 
that they have decided to embark on. 
Estimates  strongly  suggest  that  the  probability  that  policymakers  adopt  an 
exchange-rate based stabilization is higher when they are closer to the date set for 
future elections. The probability of adopting a money-based stabilization, on the 
other hand, is higher when future elections are far away and previous elections are 
closer. Moreover, the results show that the 
stock of international reserves available for policymakers, and the extent of 
the openness of the economy and fragmentation of the political power not 
only affect the choice of anchor to stabilize inflation but also the degree to 
which policymakers may be more or less opportunistic in their choice of 
anchor. For example, three different policymakers who decide to launch a   27 
stabilization program at different moments of their election cycle will have, 
respectively, 45 percent probability of choosing the exchange rate as the 
anchor three years before elections, 78 percent two years before elections,  
and 99 percent one-year prior to elections, for the case where reserves 
cover 10 percent of M3. Likewise, other things being equal, a difference of 
about  three  years  in  the  time  remaining  to  next  elections  implies  a 
difference  of  24  percentage  points  in  the  probability  of  adopting  an 
exchange-rate-based stabilization (76 percent five years before 
elections and 100 percent two years prior to elections). 
The Impact Of Elections On Different Economic Variables 
 
The  political  economy  literature  has  documented  the  impact  of  elections  on 
different economic variables ranging from public budget deficits to inflation and 
real exchange rate. In particular, theoretical and empirical papers have established 
that  the  existence  of  political  opportunism  in  developing  countries  creates  a 
common pattern where these different variables cycle around elections. 
Chronic inflation has been a major problem in the late 20th century for 
many countries in  the developing world and especially in Latin America. 
The diverse stabilization attempts pursued in Latin America, Israel, Turkey, 
and Iceland have allowed some economists to identify unique stylized facts 
for each type of stabilization strategy. The debates over what strategy to 
adopt in order to stabilize the economy have been intense, and have been 
centered  around  whether  exchange-rate-based  stabilization  (ERBS 
henceforth)  is  superior  to  money-based  stabilization  (MBS  henceforth). 
Formally, the difference between these programs lies in the selection of the 
nominal anchor to bring inflation down to normal rates. The ERBS chooses 
the exchange rate as its nominal anchor while the MBS traditionally adopts 
a monetary aggregate, such as M1 or monetary base. The consequences   28 
of the choice of the nominal anchor differ considerably and have important 
implications. 
 
The different experiences from the stabilization programs mentioned above 
have  generated  a  very  controversial  literature  regarding  the  effects  of 
disinflation  programs  on  consumption  and  output.  Easterly  (1996)  in  a 
study of a sample of stabilization programs has concluded that they are 
always expansionary. Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992) and VØgh  (1992) study 
the  business  cycles  associated  with  ERBS  in  chronic  inflation  countries 
concluding  that  they  greatly  differ  from  those  associated  with  MBS.  In 
particular, their study of a sample of stabilization episodes shows that the 
business cycle associated with ERBS begins with a boom and ends with a 
recession. Calvo and VØgh (1999) analyze stabilization programs adopted 
in Latin America and Israel. The theoretical work and empirical results of 
their  paper  are  important  because  of  the  stylized  facts  they  help  to 
establish. Table 1 shows the most relevant empirical regularities of ERBS 
and MBS considered in their paper. 
 
                   
Exchange-rate based stabilization      Money-based stabilization   
                   
Slow convergence of the inflation rate to the rate of devaluation  Slow convergence of the inflation rate to the rate of growth of the 
            money supply     
                   
Initial increase in real GDP and private consumption followed  Initial contraction in economic activity 
by a later contraction                 
                   
Real appreciation of the domestic currency      Real appreciation of the domestic currency 
                   
Deterioration of the trade balance and current account deficit  No definite response of the trade balance and the current account 
                   
Ambiguous impact response of domestic real interest rates  Initial increase in domestic real interest rates 
   29 
The most striking difference between the two stabilization strategies is the 
real effects on economic activity. In particular, as described above, ERBS 
exhibit a consumption boom early on in the program followed by a later 
contraction. In contrast, MBS exhibit an initial consumption bust followed 
by a later recovery. The literature exploring these boom-bust cycles 
has  concentrated  on  theoretical  models  replicating  the  empirical 
regularities in consumption following stabilization programs. The empirical 
literature  sought  to  test  what  is  known  as  the  ￿recession-now-versus-
recession-later￿ hypothesis, making reference to the possibility of 
delaying the disinflation costs (recession) using the exchange rate as the 
nominal anchor. It is important to note that ERBS attempts often lead to 
balance-of-payments  crisis,  loss  of  international  reserves,  and  major 
devaluations. Therefore, ex-ante, it is not a simple task to determine which 
stabilization strategy should be pursued, since initial consumption booms 
are definitely an advantage of ERBS over MBS. This might be especially 
true if the economy is in a recession prior to the launching of the program. 
 
Calvo  and  VØgh  (1999)  also  provide  theoretical  models  to  explain 
consumption  boom-bust  cycles.  Perhaps  one  of  the  most  important 
assumptions of their main model is that, at least a priori, one stabilization 
strategy  should  not  be  preferred  over  the  other.  The  only  difference 
between  them  depends  on  when  the  stabilization  costs  will  be  paid  ￿ 
earlier in the case of a MBS and later in the case of an ERBS. In other 
words, in an infinite horizon economy, the present value of consumption 
after the adoption of either stabilization strategy can be  assumed  to be 
equal.   30 
In  spite  of  the  distinctive  empirical  regularities  following  ERBS  and  MBS 
described by Calvo and VØgh (1999), some studies in the recent literature 
dispute their validity. 
Echenique  and  Forteza  (1997)  re-examine  the  existence  of  consumption 
and  output  cycles  after  ERBS  and  conclude  that  they  have  taken  place 
because  the  ERBS  are  generally  launched  when  the  world  economy  is 
booming and the country has experienced positive terms-of-trade shocks. 
Therefore, they conclude that the consumption booms after ERBS 
were more the direct result of positive macroeconomic shocks than of a 
particular choice of nominal anchor. Gould (2001) argues that the initial 
consumption  boom  and  bust  in  ERBS  and  MBS  are  endogenously 
determined by the initial conditions such as initial GDP and the 
level  of  international  reserves  of  the  different  economies  and  bear  no 
relation with the choice of anchor to stabilize inflation. 
How Opportunistic Politicians Can Choose Their Policies 
To Their Own Benefit 
It is natural to ask how opportunistic politicians can choose their policies to 
their  own  benefit  and  still  be  reelected.  The  traditional  literature  has 
attributed  two  main  alternatives  regarding  voters￿  behaviour  that  are 
theoretically consistent with political opportunism. 
1. According  to  the  first  tradition  (Nordhaus,  1975),  voters  may  be 
myopic  or  short-sighted.  The  implications  of  assuming  backward-
looking  adaptive  expectations  are  straightforward:  voters  base 
evaluations  on  the  recent  past  and  thus  reward  governments 
producing consumption booms before elections.    31 
2. Alternatively, a later tradition appeared with newer models based on 
the  ￿politician￿s  competence￿  (Rogoff  1990)  where  voters  have 
rational  expectations  but  lack  information  regarding  the  level  of 
competence of the different politicians.  
The implications of assuming rational expectations are that politicians make 
every  effort  to  signal  their  type  to  voters  by  successfully  generating  a 
consumption  boom  before  elections  with  either  a  MBS  or  an  ERBS 
depending  how  distant  are  future  elections.  Edwards  (1994)  provides 
evidence  that  adaptive  expectations  models  (retrospective  voting) 
outperform rational expectations models of political business cycles in Latin 
America.  Even  so,  since  consumption  booms  prior  to  elections  can  be 
engendered by both traditions, it is safe to remain agnostic about what 
should be the appropriate variant. In fact, this paper provides results that 
should be consistent with both theories of voter behaviour. 
Conclusion 
 
The most important result of this paper is the observed pattern regarding 
the  choice  of  anchor  to  stabilize  inflation  in  high  and  chronic  inflation 
countries. In particular, since ERBS generate an initial consumption 
boom they are on average adopted before elections and since MBS 
generate an initial recession they are on average launched after 
past, and faraway from future, elections. 
1. This  paper  also  provides  a  rationale  for  why  policymakers  may 
choose a short-run hard MBS. It seems advantageous to do it right 
after elections for two reasons. First, because economic recovery will 
take place during the term of office of the politician and,  
2. second, because the politician may blame the previous government 
for the costs implied by the adoption of the MBS. Additionally, it can   32 
be  an  alternative  strategy  for  some  countries  that,  due  to  the 
numerous failed attempts, might have exhausted the ability to use 
the exchange rate as the nominal anchor. 
3. Most  importantly,  this  paper  provides  insight  on  the 
motivations  behind  the  policymakers￿  choice  of  anchor  to 
achieve low inflation. A relatively large stock of international 
reserves,  a  high  level  of  openness,  and  high  political 
fragmentation not only increase the probability of adoption 
of  an  ERBS  but  also  affect  the  degree  of  political 
opportunism  behind  the  choice  of  nominal  anchor  for 
stabilization. 
 
This paper has suggested some possible theoretical channels that can be 
used to explain the facts that were obtained. Voters￿ behaviour and the 
ability  of  policymakers  to  opportunistically  choose  economic  policies  are 
essential ingredients in the construction of an interesting theoretical model. 
The main objective of this paper was to seriously document the economic 
and political  variables affecting  the  decision over the  anchor to stabilize 
inflation  without  taking  any  position  in  favour  of  a  particular  theoretical 
model of political opportunism or voting behaviour. 
 
It is not surprising that politicians choose economic strategies that align 
with their own goals of re-election. 
Depending on how widespread this behaviour (see table 2 & 3) is within a 
country,  this  may  suggest  that  stronger  institutional  arrangements  that 
oversee  politicians  could  reduce  the  degree  of  political  opportunism 
benefiting societies in many developing countries. 





JAMAICAN DATA  1997/8  1998/9  1999/0  2000/1  2001/2  2002/3 
    $JA(Billions)  $JA(Billions)  $JA(Billions)  $JA(Billions)  $JA(Billions) $JA(Billions) 
Net International Reserves (NIR)  21.72  21.807  29.899  57.883  94.753  87.9 
Exchange Rate(End Of Period)    38.1  42.2  45.7  47.5  56.1 
($US/JA)               
               
Source: IMF Article IV 2003 & 2004             
 
TABLE 3                   
                   
JAMAICAN IMPORTS  1999    2000    2001    2002 
      IMPORTS    IMPORTS    IMPORTS    IMPORTS 
      $JA'000    $JA'000    $JA'000    $JA'000 
                   
ALL SECTIONS    115,690,225   141,986,736    154,799,256   19,344,285 
                   
FOOD      17,969,547    19,231,697    21,899,825    3,962,022 
                   
BEVERAGES    1,271,835    1,169,438    1,387,916    1,082,063 
&TOBACCO                 
                   
CRUDE MATERIALS    2,004,156    2,224,431    2,158,594    10,136 
                   
MINERAL FUELS    16,421,471    27,961,289    27,122,564    10,112,413 
LUBRICANTS                 
                   
ANIMAL & VEGETABLE OILS  820,017    846,337    788,434    143,911 
&FATS                   
                   
CHEMICALS    13,351,110    16,141,395    17,264,771    1,325,511 
                   
MANUFACTURED GOODS  17,132,954    19,029,430    21,446,750    1,881,737 
                   
MACHINERY & TRANSPORT  25,801,624    32,220,846    40,512,298    218,207 
EQUIPMENT                 
                   
MISC. MANUFACTURED  17,272,441    19,377,008    18,141,990    608,286 
ARTICLES                 
                   
OTHER      3,645,070    3,784,865    4,076,114    0 
                   
                   
Source: Statistical Institute Of Jamaica             
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Formal Sector Pay and Employment: Two Contrasting 
Cases 
 
If one agrees that in the Jamaica, labour market policies are passive rather 
than active, as such, this has required need for a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) and the pending Partnership for Progress, which 
seeks to embrace the Leprechaun theory of Ireland but perhaps not the 
philosophy of the pot of gold thinking; then what follows may be of interest 
as it applies to Jamaica. 
 
East Asian Experience 
In some developing countries, such  as those in East Asia, Arup  Benerji, 
Edgardo Campos and Richard H. Sabot (1995) observed in the market for 
wage labor the felicitous combination of non-confrontational labor and a 
non-distributional, or encompassing, elite. By non-confrontational we mean 
that  wage  labor  was  willing  not  to,  or  was  unable  to,  use  its  collective 
power to extract short-term wage and employment gains. 
Rather, wage earners accepted wage and employment levels determined, 
respectively,  by  the  interaction  of  labor  supply  and  demand  and  by  the 
equalization  of  wages  and  the  marginal  product  of  labor.  When  labor 
decided on the non-confrontational stance voluntarily, they did so in the 
expectation that this market oriented approach would yield attractive labor 
market dynamics - that future levels of wages and employment would be 
higher if workers cooperated with management than if they did not.   35 
Key Features 
 
The  key  feature  of  the  "non-distnbutional"  or  "encompassing’  elites 
behaviour was that they acted as if their future well-being was a function  
of the future well-being of those not in the elite-all groups benefited as the 
elite adopted a labor demanding development strategy that was in accord  
with factor endowments and comparative advantage. This strategy, with its 
favourable ’implications for labor market dynamics, not only yielded high 
rates  of  growth,  but  ensured  that  the  benefits  of  growth  were  widely 
shared.  In  this  way,  it  also  helped  ensure  that  labour￿s  expectation 
regarding  the  payoff  to  non-confrontation  would  be  filed.  This  in  turn 
reinforced labour￿s non-confrontational attitude.  
Latin America And The Caribbean 
 
In many other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Arup Benerji, 
J.  Edgardo  Campos  and  Richard  H.  Sabot  (1995)  observed  in  the  labor 
market  the  less  attractive  combination  of  confrontational  labor  and  a 
distributional  elite.  In  these  countries,  wage  earners  consolidated  and 
exercised their collective power, successfully lobbying to raise wages above 
market levels, and above income levels prevailing among the self-employed 
in agriculture and elsewhere. This segmented the labor market and created 
a wage labor elite. Confrontational labor also succeeded in driving a wedge 
between  wages  and  the  marginal  product  of  labor  -  as  employers, 
particularly in the public sector, succumbed to pressure to provide more (of 
the  now  scarce,  relatively  high  wage)  employment  opportunities  than 
warranted  by  the  derived  demand  for  labor.  The  resulting  labor  market 
dynamics  tended  to  be  unattractive:  that  is,  labor  demand,  wages  and 
employment grew more    36 
 




The  development  strategies  adopted  by  distributional  elites  caused  the 
benefits of what growth there was to be concentrated in the hands of a 
few. The elites behaved as if they believed that their own future well-being 
was  independent  of  the  future  well-being  of  non  elites,  and  nearly 
everyone was less economically secure’ as a consequence. Their economic 
strategies  tended  not  to  be  in  harmony  with  factor  endowments  and 
comparative advantage. 
While these strategies may have yielded rents to the elites in the short run, 
over  the  longer  run  output  growth  was  slow  and  employment  growth 
slower still. This behaviour of the elites reinforced labor’s confrontational 
stance. 
Labor Market Combinations & Developing Countries 
 
One  of  these  two  combinations  -  non  -confrontational  labor  paired  with 
non-distributional elites, and confrontational labor in a distributional regime 
- seem to characterize most developing countries. In a few instances we 
observe  non-confrontational,  marginalized  labor  coexisting  with  a 
distributional  regime.  For  fairly  obvious  reasons,  however,  the  fourth 
possible  combination  -  confrontational  labor  and  a  non-distnbutional, 
market-oriented elite - is not sustainable.   37 
￿Labour and The Elite￿ 
 
The literature referred to the two groups very broadly as "labor" and "elite,’ 
it is useful to recognize the obvious - that neither are monolithic groups. 
This is especially true for the elite. We will confine our attention to only to 
those elite groups who directly affect the policymaking process and labor-
elite interactions. These are usually alliances of three distinct groups - the 
political elite (the ruling party, president or junta), the economic elite (large 
industry  and  commercial  leaders)  and  the  policy  elite  (Intellectuals  and 
bureaucrats).  A  fourth  group,  the  military,  is  often  a  major  influence  in 
policymaking in some developing countries, and may be identified with the 
non- policymaking political elite. 
 Labor almost always refers to organized wage labor, either represented by 
large  national  trade  unions  or  industry  groups.  Given  the  possibility  of 
heterogeneity  within  both  groups,  there  is  occasion  for  dissent  and 
conflicting objectives. In cases where they arise, the preferred outcome - 
non-confrontation or confrontation -- may be less likely. When there is a 
less  unified  elite,  similarly,  the  preferred  outcome  by  the  policymaking 
group may not be endorsed by competing elite 
How Can Jamaica Learn From These Experiences? 
 
The  review  of  the  literature  on  these  contrasting  cases  poses  two 
questions.  First,  what  determined  whether  a  country  adopted  and 
sustained the non-confrontational, non-distributional mode of labor market 
behaviour or the confrontational, distributional mode? The combination of 
non-confrontational  labor  and  non-distributional  development  strategies  
have  paid  off  for  the  countries  that  followed  them,  while  distributional    38 
strategies  and  confrontational  labor  have  resulted  in  slower  growth  and 
lower welfare for most groups in society. 
This raises the second question. When countries in which  labor mark-et 
problems have contributed to poor performance are faced with this reality, 
why doesn’t labor become non- confrontational and why don’t elites adopt 
a non-distributional policy? In essence, this change in the stance of the two 
groups  is  what  the  labor  market  dimension  of  structural  adjustment 
programs  is  trying  to  accomplish,  but  with  only  limited  success.  To 
rephrase  the  question,  if  the  advantages  of  non-confrontation  and 
encompassment  are  so  great,  why  is  it  so  difficult  to  accomplish  labor 
market  reform?  On  the  surface  there  could  be  serious  lack  of  trust. 
However,  Jamaica￿s  adoption  of  the  Leprechaun  theory  of  Ireland  and 
practicing the Pot Of Gold philosophy could give clarification and answer 
the second question in the future in Jamaica. Time will tell. 
General Conclusions 
 
  Domestic  labor  market  outcomes  influence  the  direction  and 
magnitude of the flow of international migration. When wages are 
low  and  jobs  are  scarce,  there  is  an  incentive  for  workers  to 
migrate to environments where jobs are available at higher wages. 
As labor demand grows, however, a labor-exporting country may 
become a net labor importer.  
 
  An  efficient,  flexible  and  responsive  labor  market  contributes  to 
the  growth  process  through  the  creation  of  an  appropriate 
economic environment. In this respect, labor market policy is like  
macroeconomic and trade policy. In contrast to the accumulation 
of  physical  and  human  capital  and  technical  progress,  a  well-  39 
functioning  labor  market  is  not,  in  itself  a  source  of  economic 
growth.  Yet,  labor  market  pathologies,  like  macroeconomic 
mismanagement,  can  be  extremely  costly,  severely  constraining 
growth  of  output  and  employment,  and  increasing  inequality. 
Likewise, failure to adequately address the labor market dimension 
of policy reform can result in the failure of other dimensions of 
reform. 
 
  Good  labor  market  performance  feeds  on  itself,  enhancing  the 
credibility of both labor and the elite. Likewise, poor labor market 
performance can also be self-reinforcing.  
Attempts  at  labor  market  reform  are  therefore  likely  to  be 
hampered by the lack of credibility of both labor and the elite. The 
payoff to reform can be high for both groups; the challenge is to 
find  mechanisms  whereby  the  credibility  of  both  groups  can  be 
bolstered. 
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￿Government activity increases as economies grow, with the pace of increase being different for 
different branches of government￿ 
(Wagner, A. 1911). 
 
There has been much discourse in the public media about the quality of 
and effectiveness of government spending in Jamaica. However to put in 
context  and  do  a  comparative  analysis  should  serve  to  highlight  critical 
discourse analysis and thinking rather than speaking to hyperbolic political 
diatribe;  furthermore  it  will  also  serve  to  promote  Real  Time  Thinking 
(RTT). 
Benedict  Clements,  Sanjeev  Gupta,  and  Gabriela  Inchauste  (2004)  in 
examining the short- and long-term movements of government spending 
relative to output in 51 countries found that in the short term, the main 
components of government spending increase with output in about half of 
the sample countries, with some variation across spending categories and 
countries.  Further,  that  there  is  a  long-term  relationship  between 
government spending and output for the majority of countries for at least 
one  spending  aggregate.  In  the  short  term,  that  power  dispersion  and 
government  size  typically  dampen  the  positive  response  of  government 
spending to output. Output volatility and financial risk, on the other hand, 
contribute to the procylicality of government spending. 
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The Cyclical Behavior Of Macroeconomic Aggregates 
 
There has been less research on the cyclical behaviour of macroeconomic 
aggregates in developing countries: 
 
  One  reason  for  this  is  the  relatively  weak  quality  of  data  and  its 
frequency in many developing countries. For example, quarterly GDP 
data are available for only a limited number of countries, and even 
when they are available they are usually of significantly lower quality 
and reliability than annual estimates.  
  Another  constraining  factor  is  that  developing  countries  often 
experience abrupt economic changes, making it particularly difficult 
to separate cyclical influences from structural breaks. 
 
 
A  better  understanding  of  the  factors  underlying  the  cyclical  pattern  of 
macroeconomic aggregates is useful for at least two purposes:  
 
  First,  examining  the  relationship  between  overall  economic  activity 
and  fiscal  and  monetary  aggregates  has  analytical  value  from  the 
perspective of business cycle modelling.  
 
  Second, as AgØnor and Montiel (1996) argue, this type of analysis 
can make a valuable contribution to the design of stabilization and 
adjustment  programs.  Such  as  an  Exchange  Rate  Stabilization 
Programme or a Money Based Stabilization Programme. 
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The World View 
 
Standard neoclassical and Keynesian approaches suggest that fiscal policy 
should  ideally  be  countercyclical,  with  fiscal  deficits  declining  when  the 
economy  is  expanding  and  increasing  during  economic  downturns.  For 
example,  Barro￿s  (1979)  neoclassical  analysis  of  optimal  fiscal  policy 
suggests that, for a given path of government spending, tax rates should 
be held constant over the business cycle, and the budget surplus should 
move in a procyclical fashion￿the ￿tax smoothing￿ hypothesis. However, 
with regard to the cyclicality of government spending, neoclassical theory 
has  little  to  say:  the  typical  assumption  is  that  government  spending  is 
exogenously determined (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Blanchard and Fischer, 
1989;  Taylor  and  Woodford,  1999).  The  Keynesian  approach  to  optimal 
fiscal policy reaches a broadly similar result by a different logic. According 
to this view, policy should, during economic booms, at least accommodate 
surpluses that emerge from the operation of automatic stabilizers and, if 
necessary, go further with discretionary tax increases or spending cuts. 
The Developing Country Paradigm 
 
The limited number of empirical studies for developing countries suggests 
that government spending tends to be procyclical. For example, Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and VØgh (2004) find that fiscal policy is procyclical in their sub 
sample of 83 low-  and middle-income countries. Similarly, Braun  (2001) 
finds  that  government  expenditure  is  procyclical  in  a  panel  of  35 
developing countries for the period 1970￿98. Gavin and Perotti (1997) find 
that  in  Latin  America,  total  expenditures  and  its  components  are  highly   
procyclical, with recessions being associated with exaggerated collapses in   43 
public  spending.  Further  support  for  this  is  found  in  Stein,  Talvi,  and 
Grisanti  (1999),  who  find  an  average  correlation  coefficient  of  0.52 
between  the  cyclical  component  of  government  consumption  and  the 
cyclical component of output over the period 1970￿95 for a sample of 26 
Latin  American  countries.  Similarly,  for  their  sample  of  36  developing 
countries  in  Asia,  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and  Latin  America,  Talvi  and 
VØgh (2000) find that government consumption is highly procyclical, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.53. However, by contrast, AgØnor, McDermott, 
and  Prasad  (1999)  find  that  government  consumption  expenditure  is 
countercyclical for a group of four middle-income countries including Chile, 
S. Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines. 
Challenges in implementing countercyclical policy 
 
Difficulties  in  implementing  countercyclical  policy  may  be  the  cause  of 
procyclical government spending in some countries.  
  One such factor is the structure of the budget. Developing countries 
have few automatic stabilizers built into their budgets, which would 
lead one to expect government spending in these countries to display 
less  of  a  countercyclical  pattern  than  in  industrial  countries.  For 
example, Gavin and Perotti (1997) note that Latin American countries 
spend  much  less  on  transfers  and  subsidies  than  do  richer  OECD 
economies (24 percent of total government expenditures, compared 
with 42 percent in the industrial countries). Similarly, Braun (2001) 
finds  that  40  percent  of  the  difference  in  the  degree  of  cyclicality 
between high income and developing countries can be explained by 
the larger size of government in the former, and by the larger    44 
 
proportion  of  transfers  in  expenditure,  which  act  as  automatic 
stabilizers. 
  Liquidity constraints could also play a role in limiting the capacity for 
countercyclical  policy:  during  economic  downturns,  countries  often 
face  a  loss  of  market  confidence,  and  thus  intensified  borrowing 
constraints. The loss of market access makes it impossible to run a 
countercyclical fiscal policy, at least in periods of sharp contractions 
in output. However, as Talvi and VØgh (2000) point out, it would be 
somewhat far-fetched to argue that most developing countries have 
lost  access  to  international  credit  markets  during  recessions  on  a 
systematic basis over the past three decades. 
 
  Another  important  factor  behind  the  procylicality  of  government 
spending  relates  to  institutional  factors  and  the  underlying  power 
structure of the economy. These considerations explain overspending 
of  transitory  increases  in  fiscal  revenues  (Velasco,  1993;  Perotti, 
1996;  and  Tornell  and  Lane,  1998  and  1999).  This  is  commonly 
known as the ￿voracity￿ effect, whereby a positive shock to income 
leads to a more than proportional increase in public spending, even if 
the  shock  is  expected  to  be  temporary.  This  in  turn  is  the 
consequence of weak institutions and fractionalization, manifested by 
the presence of multiple powerful groups in a society attempting to 
grab a greater share of national wealth by demanding larger public 
spending on their behalf. In a similar vein, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti 
(1999) find that, for their Latin American sample, countries with a   45 
large number of representatives elected per district, a large number 
of effective parties represented in the legislature, and weak support  
for  the  governing  party  in  the  legislature  are  associated  with  a 
stronger  procyclical  response  of  government  consumption  to  the 
business cycle. In this context, Lane (2003) finds that the political 
economy factors explaining the cyclicality of government spending in 
OECD countries vary in importance across spending categories, with 
the  government  wage  bill  being  especially  influenced  by  these 
variables.  Braun  (2001)  finds  that  political  competition  among 
powerful groups is stabilizing in OECD countries, but destabilizing in 
developing countries. 
Wagner￿s Law(Wagner, A) 
 
A  vast  literature  exists  on  ￿Wagner￿s  law,￿  which  states  that 
government activity increases as economies grow, with the pace 
of increase being different for different branches of government 
(Wagner,  1911).  Wagner￿s  law  has  been  tested  empirically  for  various 
countries  using  both  time-series  and  cross-sectional  data  sets.  Some  of 
these tests have used the stationarity properties of the data, as well as 
cointegration  analysis,  to  test  whether  there  is  a  long-run  relationship 
between income and government spending (Bohl, 1996; Lin, 1995; Murthy, 
1993; Payne and Ewing, 1996; and Chang, 2002). The results are mixed, 
with studies finding a cointegrating relationship in some countries, but not 
in others. The cointegration approach is consistent with Wagner￿s view that 
there is a long-run relationship between government spending and output, 
without necessarily implying causality. 
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Political Business Cycle 
 
Wagner, Robert E (1980), Buchanan And Wagner, Robert E. (1977) and 
Tufte (1978) speak to the concept of a Political Business Cycle.  
A  political  business  cycle  can  result  from  self-interested  attempts  by 
politicians  to  obtain  reelection.  The  PBC  literature  indicates  that  to  the 
extent that politicians can control the business cycle, they can manipulate 
such  items  as  inflation,  employment  and  disposable  income  for  self-
interested political reasons. 
Specifically, the literature on the PBC charges that politicians themselves 
understand the relationship between the phase of the business cycle (and 
economic  indicators)  and  their  reelection  prospects.  These  effects  are 
summarized as follows: 
1) Politicians  know  that  economic  movements  in  macroeconomic 
variables  such  as  inflation  and  unemployment  rates  in  the  months 
before an election make a real difference in whether they will lose or 
win the election. 
2) The  people  who  vote  will  reward  incumbent  politicians  with  for 
prosperity  (full  employment  and  price  stability)  and  will  punish 
incumbent  politicians  for  inflation  and  recession  (which  can  be 
interpreted as high unemployment rate and reductions in growth rate 
in deposable income and in industrial production). 
3) Short run spurts in real disposable income before an election help 
politicians who are in office. 
4) Politicians  will  act  in  self-interested  fashion  whenever  possible  by 
manipulating taxes,, government spending, and possibly the money 
supply(producing a Political Business Cycle) in order to stay in office. 
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These  propositions  have  been  given  a  fairly  wide  variety  of  aggregate 
empirical  tests  that  have  provided  broad  support  for  the  existence  of  a 
PBC.  However, economists  do  not  appear  to  be  in  agreement  on  which 
variables are most important. 
 
Policy Implications For Government 
 
  First, in many countries there may be scope for fiscal rules or fiscal 
responsibility laws that limit the discretion for procyclical fiscal policy 
during upswings in the business cycle.  
 
  Second, a strengthening of checks and balances￿ that is, a greater 
dispersion  of  power￿is  fully  compatible  with  good  economic 
policymaking,  since  it  helps  reduce  the  cyclicality  of  government 
outlays.  
 
  Third, in many countries there is a long-term relationship between 
the  level  of  output  and  government  spending.  In  these  countries, 
short-run  cuts  in  spending,  or  surges  in  government  outlays,  will 
eventually be erased as the government spending/GDP ratio returns 
to its long-term average. In these countries, special care will need to 
be taken to ensure that spending cuts achieved over the short run 
are accompanied by longer-term structural reforms to ensure these 
savings are durable. 
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JAMAICAN DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
Developing country Overview 
 
Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to 
provide  broad  public  goods  and  to  reduce  poverty.  Even  in  developing 
countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert 
resources  to  political  rents  and  to  private  transfers  that  benefit  a  few 
citizens  at  the  expense  of  many.  These  distortions  can  be  traced  to 
imperfections in political markets that are greater in some countries than in 
others.  In  reviewing  the  theory,  there  is  evidence  of  the  impact  of 
incomplete  information  of  voters,  the  lack  of  credibility  of  political 
promises, and social polarization, on political incentives. There are strong 
arguments  that  the  effects  of  these  imperfections  are  large  but 
insufficiently  integrated  into  the  design  of  policy  reforms  aimed  at 
improving public good provision and reducing poverty. 
Misallocation and Voter apathy 
 
Misallocation  has  persisted  despite  major  changes  in  the  way  in  which 
governments are selected and remain in office. From 1990 to 2000, the 
number of countries governed by officials elected in competitive elections 
rose  from  60  to  100  (Beck  and  others  2001,  Database  of  Political 
Institutions). 
A large fraction of voters in many of these countries are low income, if not 
poor in the strictest and most technical sense of the word. Democratization 
might be expected to benefit these voters. However, policymakers in poor 
democracies regularly divert expenditures away from those areas that most   49 
benefit the poor, or fail to implement policies that improve those services 
from which the poor are known to benefit disproportionately. 
Public Expenditure Decisions 
 
One way in which governments can accelerate economic development is 
through their decisions regarding public expenditures. Keefer and Khemani 
(2003) are of the opinion if allocated appropriately, public expenditures can 
overcome market failures that exacerbate poverty, such as the inability of 
the poor to borrow for education, their lack of information about preventive 
health care, or the externalities that exacerbate public health hazards to 
which the poor are most exposed. However, distortion and misallocation of 
public expenditures are common and often undermine development. 
Public expenditures flow to wage bills for bulky state administrations, to 
farm  subsidies  absorbed  by  the  wealthiest  farmers,  or  to  public  works 




In most countries, the distribution of income is skewed to the right￿
towards the higher end of the income spectrum￿so that the income of the 
median voter is less than the average income of all voters. Under these 
circumstances,   government should be larger and social services should be 
correspondingly more extensive (Meltzer and Richard 1981). 
However,  this  prediction  actually  exacerbates  the  puzzle  of  why  many 
countries  severely  under-provide  social  services,  since  it  is  in  many 
countries where the poor are the median voters that social services are 
often the most woeful. Moreover, there is little evidence that redistribution   50 
is greater in countries with greater income inequality (Knack and Keefer 
1997). 
Political Market Imperfections And High Quality Public Services 
 
There are numerous imperfections in political markets that help to explain 
this puzzle.  
It  is  important  to  focus  on  three  political  market  imperfections  that  are 
particularly  important  in  distorting  political  incentives  to  provide  high 
quality public services:  
  Lack of information among voters about politician performance;  
  Social  fragmentation  among  voters  manifested  as  identity-based 
voting;  
  And lack of credibility of political promises to citizens.  
 
Existing efforts  to improve  the quality of public policy towards  the  poor 
may  fall  far  short  of  achieving  their  goals  unless  they  are  expanded  to 
address specifically these imperfections. 
Broad public services most important to the poor￿health and education￿
are  also  the  services  most  vulnerable  to  these  three  distortions  of  the 
political marketplace. It is especially difficult for voters to assess the quality 
and  efficiency  of  service  provision  and  to  evaluate  the  responsibility  of 
specific political actors for service breakdowns. By the same token, political 
competitors  find  it  especially  difficult  to  make  credible  promises  about 
service provision. Moreover, politicians in many countries can only make 
credible promises to narrow groups of voters. For these voters, it may be 
politically  more  efficient  to  promise  narrow  targetable  goods,  such  as 
infrastructure provision, than it is to promise improvements in broad public   51 
services. Social fragmentation in the electorate exacerbates these problems 
of voter coordination in determining reward and punishment based upon 
political actions towards the quality of public services. To the extent that in 
developing  countries,  poor  voters  are  more  likely  to  vote  in  uninformed 
ways,  being  susceptible  to  campaign  slogans,  or  polarized  along  non-
economic  ideological  dimensions  such  as  religion  or  ethnic  identity,  and 
political promises are particularly lacking in credibility or prone to what the 
late  professor  Carl  Stone  spoke  to,  clientelism,  it  is  precisely  the  broad 
social services that are most likely to suffer. 
Social Services Suffer 
 
Theory  and  evidence  suggests  that  the  impact  is  large,  and  largest  for 
those social services such as education and health that are most important 
to  the  poor.  Information  gaps,  social  polarization  and  the  absence  of 
credible  political  competitors  lead  to  the  under  provision  of  government 
services  to  the  least  informed,  to  the  most  polarized  and  to  the  vast 
majority who do not have personal connections with a powerful patron. 
Though  there  are  many  important  efforts  experimenting  with  different 
ways to improve the ability of the poor to secure their own interests in 
government  decision  making,  to  ￿empower￿  them,  the  design  of  these 
typically  does  not  explicitly  address  the  underlying  political  market 
imperfections.  Legislative  reservations  for  minority  groups  in  India, 
decentralization  in  Pakistan,  and  participatory  budgeting  in  Brazil,  for 
example,  are  all  most  effective  to  the  extent  that  they  overcome  the 
underlying political market imperfections that notably impair governments 
services to the poor. As the earlier discussion of the effects of reservations 
in  India  suggests,  the  improvements  wrought  by  these  reforms  may  be   52 




Two types of decentralization, in particular, are often seen as responses to 
inadequate  central  government  attention  to  social  service  delivery.  The 
political economy analysis here has implications for both:  
  Decentralization  of  responsibilities  for  the  provision  of  local  public 
goods  to  the  level  of  locally  elected  village  and  municipal 
governments;  
  And  greater  autonomy  of  decision-making  at  the  level  of  service 
providers  such  as  schools  and  clinics,  with  greater  participation  of 
citizens  through  community  based  organizations  such  as  parent-
teacher associations and health committees. 
 
For decentralization to have a positive impact on social services, the 
following conditions must be satisfied: 
 
  One, voters must be more likely to use information about the quality 
of  local  public  goods  in  making  their  voting  decisions  for  local 
elections;  
 
  And two, political promises to voters at large must be more credible, 
than when decision-making over local public goods was in the hands 
of  regional  or  national  governments.  Theoretically,  the  impact  of 
decentralization on informed voting and political credibility could go 
in either direction.    53 
 
Voters may use more information about local public goods in their voting 
decisions because such information  is easier to come by and coordinate 
upon, perhaps given a more restricted set of responsibilities and greater 
observability of actions of local governments; and political agents may have 
greater credibility because of proximity to the community and reputation 
developed through social interaction over an extended period of time. 
Local Government Elections And Voter Apathy 
 
Keefer,  Narayan  and  Vishwanath  2003,  on  the  other  hand,  are  of  the 
opinion local voters may be apathetic to local elections and have little or no 
information  about  the  resource  availability  and  capability  of  local 
governments, if resources are concentrated in higher tiers of government;  
social polarization may be more intense at more local levels due to age-old 
differences across settled communities and perhaps weaker at the national 
level  owing  to  national  campaigns  of  nation-building;  and  clientelist 
promises to a few voters may be easier to make and fulfil due to closer 
social relations between the elected representatives and their clients. 
The Problem of Credibility 
 
Credibility,  like  information,  is  particularly  likely  to  be  problematic  in 
developing countries and also requires special attention. Here the key is to 
bring together two key strands of assistance to countries; one strand, by 
far the most important, to provide support for better education or health 
outcomes, and the other strand, to support political party development and 
the  development  of  political  institutions.  These  strands  are  brought 
together when outside interventions that help politicians both implement 
and take credit for broad public good improvements can lead to sustainable   54 
improvement  in  public  good  provision,  if  they  help  politicians  build  a 
reputation for performance. This is   challenging ￿ it means specifically that 
aid be provided for education and health especially in those cases where 
politicians have made emphatic, public and verifiable promises regarding 




Social polarization can have harmful effects on social service provision, just 
as on other aspects of civic life. One response of outside intervention is to 
insist that criteria other than those related to social cleavages determine 
access to resources. This may not be practical; for example, if one group is 
poorer than the other, redistributional transfers on the basis of income will 




The response to pure taste-based affiliations (voting systematically for the 
representatives of one particular ethnic group or tribe out of an exogenous 
and strong preference for anyone from that group or tribe over any other 
candidate) demands educational responses to moderate these tendencies. 
Strong  signals  from  the  center  about  the  inappropriateness  of  such 
behaviour or preferences can, over time, soften them, if not eliminate them 
entirely.  However,  if  polarization  is  due  to  tremendous  imperfections  in 
political and economic markets, as is more often the case, so that people 
retreat into the   groups with which they have the strongest personal links 
and the greatest hope of accessing resources, the appropriate response is 
to assist in reforms that remove those imperfections.   55 
How does Jamaica measure up? You be the judge. 
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Maritime Transport Costs and Port Efficiency: 
A Historical Perspective 
 
￿￿ A ship￿s carrying power varies as the cube of her dimensions, while the 
resistance offered by the water increases only a little faster than the 
square of her dimensions". 
 




Recent  literature  (Clark,  Dollar  and  Micco  2001)  has  emphasized  the 
importance of transport costs and infrastructure in explaining trade, access 
to markets, and increases in per capita income. For most Latin American 
countries, transport costs are a greater barrier to U.S. markets than import 
tariffs. In investigating the determinants of shipping costs to the U.S. with 
a large database of more than 300,000 observations per year on shipments 
of  products  from  different  ports  around  the  world.  Distance  and 
containerization matter. In addition, it was found that efficiency of ports is 
an important determinant of shipping costs. Improving port efficiency from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile reduces shipping costs by 12 percent. (Bad 
ports  are  equivalent  to  being  60%  farther  away  from  markets  for  the 
average country.) Inefficient ports also increase handling costs, which are 
one  of  the  components  of  shipping  costs.  Finally,  variations  in  port 
efficiency are linked to excessive regulation, the prevalence of organized 
crime, and the general condition of the country’s infrastructure. 
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The Liberalization Of the 1980￿s and 1990￿s 
 
These recent liberalizations have reduced tariff and, in some cases, non-
tariff barriers too. For instance, Asia reduced its average tariff rate from 
30% at the beginning of the 1980s to 14% by the end of the 1990s, and 
Latin America reduced its average tariff rate from 31% to 11%.  
These reductions in artificial trade barriers have implied that the relative 
importance of transport costs as a determinant of trade has increased.  
In  1997  total  import  freight  costs  represented  5.25  percent  of  world 
imports.  This  percentage  -which  may  seem  low-  is  mainly  driven  by 
developed  countries,  which  represent  more  than  70  percent  of  world 
imports and whose proximity to each other is reflected in a relatively low 
freight cost (4.2%). When disaggregating these costs by region, they turn 
out to be substantially higher. Although Latin America appears to have low 
freight costs relative to the other developing regions (7% compared to 8% 
for Asia   and 11.5% for Africa), the Latin American figure is weighted by 
Mexico￿s  proximity  to  its  main  trading  partner,  the  United  States,  and 
consequently low freight costs. When Mexico is excluded, Latin American 
average freight costs rise to 8.3 percent, more similar to the rest of the 
developing countries. 
How much do these transport costs affect trade and 
growth? 
As a result, some immediate questions arise. How much do these transport 
costs affect trade and growth? How much of these costs can be affected by 
government policies? The broad literature that applies the gravity approach   58 
to  the  study  of  international  bilateral  trade  shows  that  geographical 
distance, which is used as proxy for transport costs, is negatively related to  
trade. In a recent paper, Limao and Venables (2000, henceforth LV) show 
that raising transport costs by 10 percent reduces trade volumes by more 
than 20 percent. They also show that poor infrastructure accounts for more 
than 40% of predicted transport costs. In a different analysis, Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) show that shipping costs reduce the rate of growth of both 
manufactured  exports  and  GDP  per  capita.  These  authors  claim  ￿￿ 
doubling  the  shipping  cost  (e.g.  from  an  8%  to  16%  CIF  band)  is 
associated  with  slower  annual  growth  of  slightly  more  than-half  of  one 
percentage point.￿ 
 
Directional imbalance in trade between countries 
 
Directional imbalance in trade between countries implies that many carriers 
are forced to haul empty containers back. As a result, either imports or 
exports  become  more  expensive.  Fuchsluger  (2000)  shows  that  this 
phenomenon  is observed in  the bilateral trade  between  the US  and the 
Caribbean. In 1998, for instance, 72 percent of containers sent from the 
Caribbean to the US were empty. This excess of supply in the northbound 
route implied that a US exporter paid 83 percent more than a US importer 
for  the  same  type  of  merchandise  between  Miami  and  Port  of  Spain 
(Trinidad and Tobago). Similar phenomena occur in the Asian-US and the 
Asian-European  trade  routes,  where  excess  of  supply  means  that  Asian 
exporters end up paying more than 50% of extra charge in transport costs 
compared to suppliers in the US and Europe.   59 
Increasing Returns To scale 
 
Maritime transport is a classic example of an industry that faces increasing 
returns to scale. Besides increasing returns at the vessel level, there are 
economies of scale at the seaport level. For instance, at the port of Buenos 
Aires (Argentina) the cost of using the access channel is $70 per container 
for  a  200  TEU  (TEU  is  a  standard  container  measure  and  it  refers  to 
Twenty Feet Equivalent Unit. ) vessel but only $14 per container for a 1000 
TEU vessel. In general, even though most of these economies of scale are 
at the vessel level, in practice they are related to the total volume of trade 
between two regions. Maritime routes with low trade volumes are covered 
by small vessels and vice versa. 
In  addition,  the  development  of  containerized  transport  has  been  an 
important  technological  change  in  the  transport  sector  during  the  last 
decades. Containers have allowed large cost reductions in cargo handling, 
increasing  cargo  transshipment  and  therefore  national  and  international 
cabotage (Cabotage refers to transshipment of the merchandise before it 
arrives  to  its  final  destination).  In  turn,  this  increase  in  cabotage  has 
induced the creation of hub ports that allow countries or regions to take 
advantage of increasing return to scale. 
The  quality  of  onshore  infrastructure  is  an  important  determinant  of 
transport costs. LV (2000) find that it accounts for 40 percent of predicted 
transport costs for coastal countries, and up to 60% for landlocked ones. 
If a country with a relatively poor infrastructure, say at the 75th percentile 
in an international ranking, is able to upgrade to the 25th percentile,  
it will be able to reduce transport costs by between 30 and 50 percent. 
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Port Efficiency and Maritime Transport Costs 
 
Port efficiency affects maritime transport costs. The activities required at 
port level are sometimes crucial for international trade transactions. These 
include not only activities that depend on port infrastructure, like pilotage, 
towing  and  tug  assistance,  or  cargo  handling  (among  others),  but  also 
activities related to customs requirements. It is often claimed that "...the 
(in)efficiency,  even  timing,  of  many  of  port  operations  is  strongly 
influenced (if not dictated) by customs" 
Some  legal  restrictions  can  negatively  affect  port  performance.  For 
example, in many countries workers are required to have special license to 
be able to provide stevedoring services, artificially increasing seaport costs. 
Other  deficiencies,  associated  with  port  management  itself,  are  also 
harmful to country competitiveness. For instance, some ports still receive 
cargo  without  specifying  the  presentation  of  a  Standard  Shipping  Note, 
which is inconceivable in modern port practice. In many ports, it is quite 
impossible  to  obtain  a  written  and  accurate  account  of  the  main  port 
procedures,  and  sometimes  port  regulations  are  not  clear  about  the 
acceptance  of  responsibilities  (for  cargo  in  shed  or  on  the  quay,  for 
instance).  All  of  this  generates  unreasonably  long  delays,  increases  the 
risks of damage and pilferage of the products (in turn raising the 
insurance premiums), and as a consequence considerably increases costs 
associated with port activities. 
 
The Crime Variable 
 
The crime variable also turns out to be highly significant.   61 
In terms of this sample, an increase in organized crime from the 25th to 
75
th  percentiles  implies  a  reduction  in  port  efficiency  from  50th  to  25th 
percentiles. In other words, if countries like Brazil, China or India (all with 
indices around the 75th percentile) reduced their organized crime to levels 
attained by countries like Australia, New Zealand or the United Kingdom 
(all around the 25th percentile), then they would be able to increase their 
port  efficiency  index  roughly  one  point.  This  in  turn  would  generate  a 








  By the 1990s many countries had adopted a development strategy 
emphasizing integration with the global economy and therefore had 
reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. This reduction in 
artificial trade barriers has raised the importance of transport costs as 
a  remaining  barrier  to  trade.  Therefore,  any  strategy  aimed  at 




  Besides distance and other variables that no government can change, 
an  important  determinant  of  maritime  transport  costs  is  seaport 
efficiency.  An  improvement  in  port  efficiency  from  25th  to  75th   62 
percentiles  reduces  shipping  costs  by  more  than  12%,  or  the 
equivalent of 5,000 miles in distance. 
 
  Seaport efficiency is not just a matter of physical infrastructure. 
Organized crime has an important negative effect on port services, 
increasing  transport  costs.  In  terms  of  the  sample,  which  this 
research draws upon, an increase in organized crime from the 25th 
to 75
th percentiles implies a reduction in port efficiency from 50th to 
25th percentiles.  
 
  In addition the results suggest that some level of regulation increases 
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The KSAC Sustainable Development Plan And The            




￿We have been listening and learning. Conservatives now understand that 
getting big government off the back of  people requires trusting local 
communities. Restoring faith in politics means moving government closer 
to  the  people.  Strengthening  the  role  of  local  councils  and  local 
communities is the way to achieve this.￿ 
William Hague. Former Leader of the UK.Conservative Party (2001) 
 
KSAC City Development Strategy 
 
The KSAC has put firmly back on the table their Sustainable Development 
Plan/City  Development  Strategy  and  justifiable  so  as  any  well-organized 
city requires such a plan. However, will this plan reinforce the 1947- 58-
year-old model, when St Andrew was pens and grass pieces or should it 
operate within the paradigm of 21
st Century Jamaican Local Governance? 
In addition shouldn￿t the KSAC also put on the table the issue of funding 
through  Municipal  Bonds  (see  Local  Government  ministry  paper  7/03), 
which could be a panacea for funding woes not only for the KSAC but all 
parish councils? 
The St. Andrew Municipality 
 
In the Parish of St Andrew (which accounts for 85% of the councillor 
divisions  in  the  Kingston  And  St  Andrew  corporation)  many 
residential areas are under siege from:   64 
 
1) Creeping commercialism (Eastwood Park gardens has gone under, 
and it would appear Constant Spring Gardens is next)) 
2) Public  Health  violations,  which  the  United  Nations  Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) highlights but obviously the system in Jamaica 
views as not necessary. 
3) The Citizens￿ Associations are not as strong as they used to be as 
such the AUTHORITIES view requests and needs and wants not as 
priorities (The exception being The National Solid Waste Management 
Authority Hotline). 
4) However,  our  taxes  must  be  paid  or  threat  of  levy  on  property 
becomes second nature. 
The Importance Of The Parish Councillor 
 
The role of the Parish councillor is an important factor in whether or not 
democracy works to the satisfaction  of the citizens in St. Andrew. More 
often  than  not,  these  are  the  individuals  who  decide  those  issues  that 
make life easier for all of us in St Andrew. 
 
Many Parish Councillors were elected because they are successful in some 
other endeavour in the community. Unfortunately, this doesn￿t mean they 
will be successful automatically in their new role as councillor. Success 
in whatever you do to earn a living should not be construed as the only 
preparation they need to be successful elected leaders. 
The Importance Of Leadership 
The  importance  of  leadership  at  the  local  level  is  important  for  the 
following reasons: 
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1. Never before has the need for leadership at the local level been so 
important obvious. We live in a global world, one where actions that 
are taken in one part of the world often affect those who live thousands 
of kilometres away. 
2. Many of the problems parish councillors are called upon to solve as an 
elected  councillor  are  so  complex  that  they  require  leadership 
strategies, not administrative fixes. 
3. The magnitude and frequency of ￿foreign policy￿ issues and concerns 
(working with others beyond the borders of the local government you 
serve) have increased significantly in recent years. You can no longer 
ignore these external affairs in your efforts to build your own 
community. 
4. The seemingly endless saga of shrinking resources and growing 
demands for services at the local level has rendered the caretaker 
approach to government not only inoperative, but dangerous to the long 
term health and viability of your communities. 
Parish Councillor Empowerment (PCE) 
 
In order for serious Parish Councillor Empowerment (PCE) to occur in order 
to heighten service levels (especially the enabling and facilitator roles of 
the parish councillor) socially, politically and economically the parish of St 
Andrew must become a municipality. 
Municipality Structure 
 
The Municipality membership would be comprised of  
The Councillor divisions of: 
 
  St Andrew South 
  St Andrew South West   66 
  St Andrew E.C. 
  ST Andrew W C 
  ST Andrew NW 
  ST Andrew NE 
  ST Andrew NC 
  ST Andrew SE 
  ST Andrew West Rural 
  St Andrew East Rural 
  St Andrew Eastern 
  St Andrew Western 
 
We in St Andrew would elect our own mayor, similar to Portmore. 
 
The Primary Objectives Of The St Andrew Municipality 
 
The Primary Objectives Of The St Andrew Municipality would be as follows: 
1. Improved quality of life through well-managed urban service delivery, 
enhanced  urban  design  and  land  use  zoning,  and  infrastructure 
improvements. 
2. Improved  environmental  quality  of  the  municipality  through  the 
management  of  coastal  and  mountain  ecosystems,  integrated  land 
use planning, enhanced environmental stewardship of the urban built 
environment and the design and upgrading of urban green spaces. 
3. Increased  socio-economic  opportunities  through  the  creation  of  an 
enabling environment for business (public order, rule of law, orderly 
planning  and  enforcement,  the  restoration  and  maintenance  of 
infrastructure  such  as  markets,  parking  lots,  property  tax  reforms 
etc)  the  creation  of  city-wide  strategies  for  economic  development   67 
and  revenue  enhancement  and  strategies  that  explicitly  target  the 
urban poor. 
 
4. Improved management capability within the local authority as well as 
civil society to undertake and manage local sustainable development. 
5. The transfer of lessons learned in the unfolding of local sustainable 
development process in the municipality into national planning and 
local government reforms. 
Financing Of The St. Andrew Municipality 
The St Andrew Municipality would be financed from: 
￿ Property taxes collected from holdings in the boundaries of the 
Municipality  
￿ Motor vehicle Licence fees (a proportionate share Of receipts by the 
Parish Council) 
￿ Local rates: in respect of specified related services and municipal 
improvements  
￿ Trade and spirit licenses 
￿ Building fees 
￿ Fees from other regulatory functions  
￿ User fees and charges 
Local Government Reform Programme 
 
Finally, since the vision of the Local Government Reform Programme 
(see ministry paper 7/03,pg. 10) is as follows: 
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1. Participatory:  it  will  create  the  space  for  our  citizens  to  become 
involved  in  the  affairs  of  their  communities  as  a  right,  thereby 
establishing  a  firm  and  transparent  basis  upon  which  our  societal 
arrangements may be made to flourish.  
2. Autonomy: there would be a clear defining line between the roles of 
Central Government and Local Government.  
3. Accountability: the citizens themselves would constitute a monitoring 
mechanism  to  ensure  efficiency  in  the  use  of  financial  and  other 
resources  that  are  available  to  address  the  economic  and  social 
development of specific localities.  
4. Developmental: it will facilitate a process of development that makes 
for the creation of wealth and the reduction of poverty.  
5. Empowerment:  it  will  empower  citizens  and  communities  to  take 
responsibility  for  the  management  of  their  economic,  health, 
educational, cultural and recreational needs.  
 
The  Ministry  Of  Local  Government  should  have  no  problem  in 
considering  this  radical  suggestion,  which  some  (the  less  politically 
focussed) would say is bordering on the ranting and ravings of political 
lunacy. 
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1) The formation of the St. Andrew Municipality between 2003-2006. 
2) Adjustment of Funding/Budget to St Andrew instead of Kingston. 
3) 3-5 councillor seats that could swing to the JLP, based on actions 
resulting from (2). (See Local Election results 2003). 
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The Brain Drain: A Developing Country Perspective 
Overview 
 
The  current  wave  of  economic  globalization  has  opened  a  window  of 
opportunity for human capital to agglomerate where it is already abundant 
and yet best rewarded, i.e., in the most economically advanced countries. 
This natural tendency has been strengthened by the gradual introduction 
of  selective  immigration  policies  in  many  developed  countries  since  the 
1980s. What started as an effort to increase the "quality￿ of immigration in 
countries such as Australia or Canada has developed into an international 
competition for attracting the highly educated and skilled. Together with 
traditional self-selection effects on the supply-side, this explains the overall 
tendency for migration rates to be much higher for the highly-skilled. While 
the world export/GDP ratio has increased by 51 percentage points between 
1990 and 2000 (WTO, 2004), the total number of foreign-born individuals 
residing  in  developed  countries  has  increased  in  the  same  proportion 
(51%) over that period,  a  ￿figure  that  jumps to 70%  for  highly skilled 
migrants against only about 28% for low-skilled migrants  
(Docquier and Marfouk, 2004). 
Consequences of this human capital flight for Jamaica 
 
What  are  the  consequences  of  this  human  capital  flight  for  developing 
countries  like  Jamaica?  In  a  world  of  perfect  competition  with  complete 
markets,  the  free  mobility  of  labor  would  seem  to  be  Pareto-improving: 
migrants receive higher incomes, locals in the receiving countries can share   72 
the immigration surplus, and remaining residents in the sending countries 
can benefit from the rise in the land/labor and capital/labor ratios.  
 
However, in the case of highly skilled migrants, such labor movements 
also generate a number of externalities that have to be factored in:  
  First,  skilled  migrants  are  net  contributors  to  the  government  of 
Jamaica￿s  (GOJ)￿s  budget  and  their  departure,  therefore,  increases 
the fiscal burden on those left behind (fiscal externality).  
  Second, skilled labor and unskilled labor complement one another in 
the production process; in a context of scarcity of skilled labor and 
abundant unskilled labor, as is the case in developing countries like 
Jamaica,  skilled  labor  migration  may  have  a  substantial  negative 
impact  on  low-skilled  workers￿  productivity  and  wages 
(intergenerational spillover) and increase domestic inequality.  
  Third,  human  capital  depletion  through  emigration  would  seem  to 
impact  negatively  on  a  country￿s  growth  prospects,  inasmuch  as 
human capital formation is now viewed as a central engine of growth 
(intergenerational spillover).  
  Fourth,  as  demonstrated  in  various  new  economic  geography 
frameworks (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999), skilled labor is instrumental in 
attracting  FDI  and  fostering  R&D  expenditures  (technological 
externality); hence, the mobility of human capital is contributing to 
the concentration of economic activities in special locations, at  the 
expense of origin regions. 
  On  the  other  hand,  high-skill  migration  may  also  induce  positive 
feedback effects as skilled emigrants continue to affect the economy 
of their origin country. Such possible feedbacks:   73 
1. Include migrants￿ remittances,  
2. Return  migration  after  additional  skills  have  been  acquired 
abroad, 
3. And  the  creation  of  networks  that  facilitate  trade,  capital 
inflows and knowledge diffusion. 
 
Government Policy Implications 
 
  From  the  perspective  of  developing  countries  like  Jamaica,  the 
"optimal" emigration rate for the highly skilled is with respect to the 
country’s level of development.  
  As to education policy, the role of taxes and education subsidies is 
significant  when  human  capital  is  mobile  internationally  and  show 
how optimal policy responses to such mobility. 
Conclusions 
 
Docquier and Marfouk (2004) who have done extensive research on the 
international  mobility  of  the  highly-skilled;  based  on  immigration  data 
collected  from  nearly  all  OECD  countries  in  1990  and  2000  draw  the 
following conclusions: 
  The main conclusion to draw from the above analysis is that for any 
given developing country such as Jamaica, the optimal migration rate 
of its highly educated population is likely to be positive. Whether the 
current  rate  is  greater  or  lower  than  this  optimum  is  an  empirical 
question that must be addressed country by country.  
  This  implies  that  countries  that  would  impose  restrictions  on  the 
international  mobility  of  their  educated  residents,  arguing  for 
example  that  emigrants￿  human  capital  has  been  largely  publicly   74 
financed,  could  in  fact  decrease  the  long-run  level  of  their  human 
capital stock.  
  This  also  suggests  that  rich  countries  should  not  necessarily  see 
themselves as free riding on poor countries￿ educational efforts.  
  The difficulty is then to design quality-selective immigration policies 
that would address the differentiated effects of the brain drain across 
origin countries without distorting too much the whole immigration 
system; this could be achieved, at least partly, by designing special 
incentives  to  return  migration  to  those  countries  most  negatively 
affected  by  the  brain  drain,  and  promote  international  cooperation 
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The Memorandum of Understanding arrived at on the 16th day of February 
2004 between the Government of Jamaica and The Jamaica Confederation 
of Trade Unions Acknowledged that the country faces: 
(a) A High Debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio 
(b) A large Fiscal Deficit 
(c) Low Economic Growth and 
(d) Low Employment Creation 
it  was  also  recognized  that  these  combine  to  create  a  path  that  is 
unsustainable  and  therefore  agree  that  in  the  National  Interest  it  is 
imperative  that  all  sectors  should  cooperate  to  halt  and  correct  the 
situation. Consequently, it was agreed that the Government would in good 
faith  pursue  the  appropriate  macro-economic  policies,  which  provide  a 
stable economic environment and encourage GDP growth and employment 
creation. 
With  respect  to  section  d,  low  employment  creation,  what  if  Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMP￿s) were seriously pursued in Jamaica, would 
there be a need for a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU)? 
 
Among  the  possible  solutions  could  be  the  introduction  of  government 
policies to better mold labor force characteristics to changes in demand, to 
lower firms￿ labor costs directly and to increase job-search efficiency.   76 
These policies have been grouped under the label of Active Labour Market 
Policies (ALMPs). 
The aggregate effect of ALMPs on employment finds a positive correlation 
between spending on ALMPs as a percentage of GDP and the employment 
rate in the business sector. 
ALMPs, direct subsidies to job creation were the most effective in raising 
employment rates, while expenditures on training programs seem to have 
been largely ineffective. By estimating a wage-setting curve for the same it 
is also shown that substantial wage moderation (reduction in real wages 
adjusted by technology for a given rate of unemployment) was associated 
with increases in ALMPs. 
Even though ALMPs do increase employment, they also weigh heavily on 
the budget. Institutional reforms to lower production costs and enhance 
labor market flexibility and work incentives are a better way to increase 
employment rates. 
Advantages Of ALMP￿s 
 
Marcello Estevªo (2003) summarizes the advantages of ALMP￿s as follows: 
 
  ALMPs may generate more efficient matching between job vacancies 
and  unemployed  workers  because  of  adjustments  in  job  seekers￿ 
skills  (for  instance,  through  training  programs)  or  more  effective 
searching (for instance, through more active employment agencies). 
The  resulting  smaller  ratio  between  vacancies  and  unemployment 
reduces wage pressure, which causes a downward shift in the wage-
setting  curve,  and,  because  vacancies  are  costly  to  employers,   77 
provides an outward shift in labor demand. Both effects will tend to 
raise employment with an uncertain final effect on real wages. 
  Labor  force  productivity  may  increase,  owing  to  either  training 
programs or on-the-job learning, in the case of direct subsidies to job 
creation.  It  may  also  affect  non-program  participants  through  an 
externality effect. This productivity increase would shift labor demand 
up and lift employment and wages. 
  ALMPs may keep unemployed workers attached to the labor force, 
even  after  a  longer  period  of  inactivity.  The  resulting  stronger 
competition for jobs would shift the wage-setting curve down, raising 
employment and reducing wages. 
 
  Job creation programs (e.g., direct subsidies to low-skill employment) 
may  generate  windfall  effects,  i.e.,  substitute  for  non-subsidized 
employment,  making  ALMPs  ineffective.  However,  the  associated 
income effect from an overall reduction in labor costs could be large 
enough  to  increase  labor  demand,  implying  higher  wages  and 
employment in equilibrium. 
 
  An  important  caveat  should  be  noted.  Even  if  a  positive  effect  on 
employment  might  be  discerned,  the  fiscal  cost  of  ALMPs  may  be 
very  high,  raising  the  question  of  their  overall  effectiveness  in  a 
general equilibrium or cost-benefit sense.   78 
The OECD Labor Market Policies 
 
Martin  and  Grubb  (2001)  OECD  Labor  Market  Policies  database  includes 
expenditures  on  programs  targeted  to  particular  labor  market  groups, 
therefore excluding general employment or macroeconomic policies. So,  
some  important  policies,  as  non-targeted  reductions  in  taxes  and  social 
security  contributions,  would  not  be  considered  expenditures  in  labor 
market programs even if they lowered labor costs. The data for ALMPs are 
broken down into five categories: 
 
  Public  employment  services  and  administration  ￿  It  includes 
placement, counseling, and vocational guidance; job-search courses; 
support for geographic mobility and similar costs in connection with 
job-search  and placement. It also encompasses overhead costs of 
labor  market  and  unemployment  benefit  agencies,  and  other 
administrative costs. 
  Labor market training ￿ It includes measures related to labor market 
policies that are not targeted to youth or disabled individuals. It is 
broken down in  two parts: (i) training for unemployed adults and 
those at risk; and (ii) training for employed adults. 
  Youth  measures  ￿  It  includes  only  special  programs  for  youth  in 
transition from school to work and is broken down in two parts: (i) 
measures for unemployed and disadvantaged youth; and (ii) support 
of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training. 
  Subsidized  employment  ￿  It  comprises  targeted  measures  to 
promote employment for unemployed individuals (other than youth 
or the disabled) and is broken down in three parts: (i) subsidies to 
regular employment in the private sector; (ii) support of unemployed   79 
persons starting enterprises; and (iii) direct job creation (public or 
nonprofit). 
  Measures for the disabled ￿ It includes only special programs for the 
disabled, limited to two types of policies: (i) vocational rehabilitation; 
and (ii) work for the disabled. 
 
The identification of the effect of expenditures on these policies will depend 
on controlling for expenditures in PLMPs (Passive Labour Market Policies) 
to  account  for  the  strong  positive  correlation  between  them.  The  OECD 
database has information on PLMPs broken down in two categories: 
  Unemployment  compensation  ￿  It  comprises  all  forms  of  cash 
benefits to compensate for unemployment, except early retirement. 
In  addition  to  unemployment  insurance  and  assistance,  it  includes 
publicly  funded  redundancy  payments  and  other  compensation  for 
jobless workers due to firms permanent or seasonal shutdown. 
  Early  retirement  for  labor  market  reasons  ￿  It  includes  special 
schemes in which retirement pensions are paid to individuals without 
work or otherwise because of  labor market policies. Only subsidized 
early pensions rather than funded schemes  within regular pension 
plans  (e.g.,  by  actuarially  calculations  of  the  amounts  paid)  are  
taken into consideration. 
The strict classification of programs into these categories may leave out 
key national policies which national researchers could consider important 
employment programs. 
 





Whether ALMPs are cost-effective from a budgetary perspective remains to 
be determined. Despite their overall positive impact on employment rates, 
their budgetary cost is high and they are likely to be subject to diminishing 
returns  as  employment  rates  rise.  At  the  present  level  of  employment 
rates, ALMPs could recoup their cost (or not) if they place benefit recipients 
into  jobs  and  these  benefits  are  phased  out.  However,  this  type  of 
accounting does not consider, among other factors, the social benefits of 
lowering unemployment. In any case, given the negative effect of current 
institutional arrangements on Jamaican employment, institutional reforms 
seem to be a better bet for improving labor utilization without unduly high 
costs  to  the  society  as  a  whole.  Among  the  many  possible  reforms  the 
research  examined;  the  estimated  coefficients  for  the  (admittedly 
rudimentary) institutional variables used in the econometric work suggest 
that  reductions  in  tax  wedges,  in  benefits  replacement  rates,  in  public 
sector  employment,  and,  more  generally,  in  insiders￿  wage  bargaining 
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THE ROLE OF THE JAMAICAN MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT 
PROLOGUE 
 
The Jamaican Member Of Parliament has gone through a multiplicity of role 
changes since 1944. This role has been changing and although others have 
evolved, in the paradigm of the 21
st century Knowledge Based Society and 
Economy (KBSE) these need to be clearly defined. This brief serves as a 
prelude  to  the  Jamaican  Member  Of  Parliament  Manual:  21st 
Century Political Leadership For The Jamaican People. 
 
Community  Driven  Development/Community  Based  Development  is 
facilitating economic development in developing countries like Jamaica. The 
top down approach in developing countries has proven to waste funds and 
not give communities what they really want. However some governments 
have  deemed  it  fit  to  undermind  this  CDD/CBD  approach  by  cutting  off 
funds for maintenance after successful implementation of such projects. 
The multilateral funding agencies are seeking to address this problem.  
In  the  context  of  the  Jamaican  Local  Government  Reform  Programme, 
what will eventually happen in the medium to long term (5-10 years) is the 
Jamaican Member Of Parliament will eventually become a legislator, SESP1 
will  disappear  and  the  role  of  Local  Government  will  become  more 
prominent.  This  will  require  a  Member  of  Parliament  whose  ability  to 
operate within this new 21
st century paradigm to be well educated (this is a 
life-long  process  and  does  necessarily  speak  to  the  post-secondary 
process), intelligent and extremely street smart (Emotional Quotient-EQ). 
                                                 
1 Social Economic & Support Programme (SESP), Jamaican Member of Parliament welfare programme.   82 
In  examining  the  Local  Government  2003-2005(qualitatively  and 
quantitatively), the successful mayors will not be judged by their ability to 
manipulate  a  Public  Relations  Illusion  (PRI),  but  those  who  are 
perceived  to  have  performed,  that  is,  those  who  have  mastered  the 
delicate balance between intricate public policy and its application on the 
ground. To tell Jamaica that you were not successful because you were not 
funded  effectively,  speaks  to  failed  leadership.  There  are  eight  (8)  who 
have  mastered  the  balance;  post  the  2006  Local  Government  Elections 
these will have to be Case Studied for posterity. The remainder are victims 
of what Dollery and Wallis in their four-fold typology in public choice theory 
refer to as Asymmetric Information Councillor Capture (AICC) and 
do  not  clearly  understand  their  roles  (the  same  can  be  applied  at  the 
Member  Of  Parliament  Level)  as  such  their  well  intentioned  vision  for 
effective  local  governance  has  been  lost  in  an  abyss  of  political  and 
administrative  chaos,  and  attempts  by  them  to  seriously  address  this 
matter at this late stage is futile as the populace, the voters are no longer 
information ignorant. 
 
The art of politics is dynamic, ever changing. As such, to operate within the 
paradigm  of  the  21
st  century  Knowledge  Based  Society  (KBS)  is  ideal.  
However, many Members of Parliament are not operating within, as they 
do not truly understand their role, as such, they continue to operate on the 
1944 model (which saw unique political challenges in the 1997 and 2002 
General Elections). The 1944 model speaks to a Static Competitive  
Political  Model  (SCPM)  as  opposed  to  a  Dynamic  Competitive 
Political Model (DCPM), which is what is required. 
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In Mr. Edward Seaga￿s the Jamaica Labour Party: Developing a New 
Political Order (1995), a seminal work, he speaks to the implementation 
of impeachment legislation; had this been implemented, 90% of Jamaican 
elected officials would have been impeached by now. I guess the lord 
works in a mysterious way. 
The  Manual  will  examine  the  role  of  the  Jamaican  Member  of 
Parliament in the following areas but not limited to: 
 
1) Member Of Parliament As Policymaker 
2) Member Of Parliament as Decision maker 
3) Member Of Parliament as Communicator 
4) Member Of Parliament as Facilitator 
5) Member Of Parliament as Enabler 
6) Member Of Parliament as Negotiator 
7) Member Of Parliament as Financier 
8) Member Of Parliament as Power Broker 
9) Member Of Parliament as Institution Builder 
10)Member Of Parliament as Overseer 
11)Member Of Parliament as Leader 
12)Member Of Parliament as Guardian Of The Environment 
 
 
Clearly, the task of  Jamaican Member Of Parliament is  an arduous one, 
however,  to  every  problem  or  challenge  there  is  a  solution,  some  will 
survive by finding creative solutions to these challenges within the social,  
economic and harsh political environment of Jamaica. Others will not and 
be ravaged at the polls as their predecessors have been. 
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THE SPECTER OF AN IGNORANT OR INDIFFERENT 
POLITICIAN HAS LONG HAUNTED DEMOCRACY. 
Overview 
 
My recommendation  is  this: politicians ought,  at this stage of history  in 
Jamaica,  to  seize  aggressively  all  opportunities  for  asserting  their  own 
ignorance. Especially those who have recently arrived and whose grasp of 
effective Political administration to seriously enhance their own positions in 
maintaining political patrimony is strongly self-evident; especially those in 
certain  political  parties  who  through  the  BGD  (Bullets,  Guns  and 
Destruction) theory (a theory not new which goes back to the time of Attila 
the Hun) have come to power and now are attempting to re define policy 
and political theory along a type of anti thesis apriori approach (donkey 
Logic) and promote it as a winning formula.  
Airhead Thinking 
 
This  ￿AIRHEAD￿  Thinking  can  possible  win  elections,  but  those  who 
practice  it  when  they  come  to  power,  their  opponents  use  Asymmetric 
Information  Politician  Capture  Theory  (AIPCT)  against  them  and  bring 
them  to  ground  zero.  We  only  have  to  examine  our  political  landscape 
within the last six to eight months to see this in action. 
There are some politicians in Jamaica after they win elections they remain 
in  the  Campaign  mode.  From  a  party  perspective  this  may  be  a  good 
approach  although  costly;  but  their  political  ignorance  of  public 
administration,  how  government  should  run  effectively  and  efficiently  is 
sadly  lacking  as  they  know  how  to  win  votes  and  elections  but  their   85 
political ignorance in converting this political capital in to serious political 
patrimony  is  seriously  lacking.  This  leads  to  one-term  governments  and 
some are thrown out of office before their term ends. In being thrown out 
of power they blame their opponents for undermining them. Clearly they 
themselves through Public Policy Ignorance (PPI) are victims of their own 
over all political ignorance. 
A Vast Fund Of Ignorance 
 
I start  from the premise that politicians in Jamaica  have a vast  fund of 
ignorance to exploit. There are important items of factual information they 
do not have, there are critical relationships they do not understand, and 
there are potentialities for the future that they are not aware of. 
Politicians are generally well aware of the limitations of their knowledge. 
And they do not ordinarily conceal it from the non-politicians with whom 
they  deal.  But  their  statements  of  their  own  ignorance  tend  to  be 
apologetic confessions, whereas my recommendation is that they should be 
aggressive assertions.  
The inability of politicians to know certain important things is itself a fact of 
great  significance.  Politicians  are  probably  the  people  best  qualified  to 
analyze the implications, for company action and for government policy, of 
their own ignorance. 
They should strive to make their lack of knowledge a part of the positive 
content  of  decision-making,  rather  than  a  sad  apologetic  footnote  to  it. 
This is what I mean by an aggressive assertion of ignorance.    86 
Decision-making is an inescapable necessity in government 
operations 
 
I have in past writings occasionally ventured the opinion that much of the 
Political posturing that is done in the ordinary way is not only useless but 
also harmful. Decision-making is an inescapable necessity in government 
operations.  Any  decision  has  to  be  made  in  the  light  of  relevant  facts, 
which are known, but also in recognition of what is unknown and perhaps 
unknowable. The worst thing the politician can do for people is to obscure 
the line between what is known and what is unknown. 
This is almost exactly what is done in the customary procedures of political 
posturing. The Politician, fully aware of his own limitations, feels obliged 
simply  "to  do  the  best  he  can"  in  providing  forecasts  of  anything  his 
principals want forecasted.  
Formulation of National Economic Policies  
 
I also believe that a more aggressive assertion by politicians of ignorance is 
desirable in the formulation of national economic policies. The fine-tuning 
approach to monetary and fiscal policy would, of course, be fully justified if 
their knowledge of the changing economic situation were always complete. 
But  if  their  explanations  of  the  limitations  in  their  knowledge  are 
apologetic, rather than aggressive, we are not likely to deter policy makers 
from the fine-tuning approach. 
An aggressive assertion of their ignorance, and an analytic exploration of 
its consequences, leads however to a rejection of the fine-tuning approach 
altogether.  The  decision-making  strategy  which  takes  full  account  of 
ignorance leads in the direction of maintaining a relatively steady posture 
in fiscal and monetary policy.   87 
The Crime Situation In Jamaica 
 
National  policy  in  regard  to  the  crime  situation  in  Jamaica  is  a  prime 
example of how an aggressive assertion of ignorance can be of great help. 
Their own fund of ignorance on it is so large. Furthermore, I am proud of 
the fact that I came by my ignorance the hard way-through long study 
which  revealed  that  most  of  what  I  knew  about  crime  and  violence  in 
Jamaica wasn’t so. An aggressive assertion of ignorance on the crime and 
violence problem (whatever that may be) would have led to better national 
policy decisions in that area than we have in fact had.  
One logical reaction from Politicians to my emphasis on ignorance may be 
to advocate more and bigger programs of research to fill in the knowledge 
gaps.  I  don’t  mean  to  argue  against  this  approach  but  I  do  have 
reservations about its fruitfulness. Much of what we would like to know is, 
I think, not only unknown in practice but also unknowable in principle. 
The  reason  I  say  this  is  that  there  seems  to  me  to  be  an  inherent 
contradiction  in  the  belief  that  we  ever  can  know  certain  things.  For 
example, if we ever became able to predict the large and sudden changes 
in the inventory situation that are occasionally recorded, they would cease 
to happen.  
Heisenberg principle of uncertainty 
 
Perhaps  what  is  needed  in  politics  in  Jamaica  is  an  equivalent  of  the 
Heisenberg  principle  of  uncertainty  in  physics.  This  kind  of  precise 
definition of what we can know and can’t know would, I believe, be a most 
notable  contribution  to  the  science  and  a  most  helpful  guide  to 
practitioners of the art of politics.    88 
All this shouldn’t be too shocking and it may even be trite. If politicians in 
Jamaica really knew what they are supposed (by others and sometimes by 
themselves) to know, there would be a good case for a centrally planned 
economy. We can save society from that fate by asserting our ignorance 
aggressively.  
 
N.B. This is dedicated to a Politician who has become power drunk 
and whose IGNORANCE of important policy linkages at the local 
and  national  levels  has  become  parochial,  even  though  he  has 














   89 
Political Rule By ￿Thuggism￿: Brawn vs. Brain 
 
 
THUG, ￿Test Hugging Up Gunman￿. The word originally comes from India 
and first coined by the British during their sojourn there until the Indian 
population asked them to leave. 
 
THUGS are no longer illiterate they have gone to Universities worldwide in 
developing  and  developed  countries,  but  their  philosophy  remains  the 
same THUG, sociologically, they use their formalized knowledge and power 
to gain wealth to cement their thug theory of ￿bling￿ and overt showing of 
extravagance. 
Countries of war torn Africa, Southern Europe and certain inner-city areas 




As  a  result  of  their  newly  found  formalized  educational  skills(formal, 
informal and non formal), the thug practicing Thuggism now known as the 
civilized  thug,  display  the  following  philosophical  thinking  and  they  are 
found in many areas: Political life, Political parties ,government, public and 
private sectors; as follows: 
 
1) Best practices and Corporate Governance is of little or no importance: 
the end always justifies the means. 
2) Monetary gain always exceeds the Social, Political and Economic. 
3) Power at any cost, whether this brings loss of life, loss of fame or 
serious scandal. 
4) The theory of corruption is redefined.   90 
5) They  see  no  need  to  keep  current,  knowledge  gained  once  is 
absorbed  and  that  limits  their  databases  for  their  particular  gain 
forever. 
 
Downside to THUGGISM and application of the theory in the 
Short term. 
 
1) They achieve great strides in the short term, however in the medium 
to long term, which speaks to expanded and current data bases they 
falter  seriously.  This  speaks  to  collapsed  governments  as  seen  in 
many  developed  and  developing  countries  and  high  levels  of 
corruption and white collar crime. 
2) For the said reason they have alienated so called traditional thinking 
technocrats because of their thuggistic tendencies, low self esteem 
and limited databases; companies collapse, government collapses as 
they are overwhelmed by policy matters which to them are not really 





Thuggism can make Governments win elections; companies grow, but in 
the medium to long term the art of Thuggism must be constrained and a 
balance of old and realistic political philosophy and concepts of accurate 
public administration must  prevail. Failure to do so will result in serious 
anarchy  and  a  failed  state  syndrome,  whether  it  is  an  organization,  a 
company or government. 
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To Serve the Jamaican Community or Oneself 
 
 
￿I Solemnly and Sincerely Swear that Above All Else I Will Faithfully Serve 
The People.￿ 
Civil Servants Proclamation Act, Federal Republic of Ethiopia 
Overview 
 
Embezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout 
the developing world. Research on this issue is hindered by problems of 
measurement. To overcome these problems Barr, Lindelow and Serneels 
2004  used  an  economic  experiment  to  investigate  the  determinants  of 
corrupt behaviour. They focused on three aspects of behaviour:  
(i)  Embezzlement by public servants;  
(ii)  Monitoring effort by designated monitors; and,  
(iii)  Voting  by  community  members  when  provided  with  an 
opportunity to select a monitor.  
The  experiment  allows  one  to  study  the  effect  of  wages,  effort 
observability, rules for monitor assignment, and professional norms.  
 
The following observations were made in the experiment: 
  It was found that service providers who earn more embezzle less, 
although the effect is small.  
  Embezzlement is also lower when observability (associated with the 
risk of being caught and sanctioned) is high, and    92 
  When  service  providers  face  an  elected  rather  than  randomly 
selected monitor.  
  Monitors put more effort into monitoring when they face re-election 
and  when  the  public  servant  receives  a  higher  wage.  
 
  Communities  re-elect  monitors  who  put  more  effort  into  exposing 
embezzlement.  
 
The Public Servant Conflict 
 
Public servants often face a conflict between their private interests and the 
interests of the people they are hired to serve. Too great an emphasis on 
the  former  can  manifest  itself  as  inappropriate  or  corrupt  behaviour, 
absenteeism,  informal  charging  and  misappropriation  of  equipment  and 
other resources. Such behaviour is particularly prevalent in the developing 
world, although it is also a problem in many developed countries (Ensor 
and Duran-Moreno 2002). 
 
The Principal-Agent Model and Corruption 
 
The principal agent model provides the basis for much of the literature on 
corruption  (Bardhan  1997;  Klitgaard  1988;  Rose-Ackerman  1978).  Here, 
the focus is on the trade-off between the expected costs and benefits of a 
corrupt act. Most models identify wages as an important determinant of 
corruption, with low salaries increasing its prevalence (Becker and Stigler 
1974; Chand and Moene 1999; Mookherjee and Png 1995). Low wages can 
also result in selection, whereby poor performers who are more likely to   93 
engage  in  rent  seeking  are  attracted  to  the  public  sector  (Besley  and 
McLaren 1993). 
 
The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctioning Institutions 
 
Monitoring  and  sanctioning  institutions  impact  on  the  expected  cost  of 
corruption.  But  they  also  introduce  new  conflicts  of  interest.  Indeed, 
corruption  can  emerge  because  there  are  opportunities  for  mutually 
beneficial  transactions between monitors and  agents (Becker and Stigler 
1974; Khalil and Lawarree 1995; Mookherjee and Png 1995).  
In  most  developing  countries  monitoring  is  the  duty  of  (other)  public 
servants  who  are  themselves  under-paid,  under-motivated,  and 
disinterested  in  the  performance  of  public  service  providers.  In  the 
literature  on  decentralization,  some  have  argued  that  community 
participation strengthens accountability and improves governance; others 
question this, pointing to the lack of salient capacity at the community level 
(Banfield  1979;  Manor  1999;  Prud￿homme  1995).  Shleifer  and  Vishny 
(1993) aim to reconcile these views by proposing that corruption may be 
less severe in highly centralized and  decentralized states, than  in states 
with an intermediate level of institutional centralization. 
Empirical Analysis Of Public Servant Corruption 
 
While  this  theoretical  literature  has  generated  many  insights  into  the 
possible  causes  of  corruption,  empirical  verification  has  proven  difficult. 
Chiappori and SalaniØ (2002), for example, highlight the general mismatch 
between  theoretical  predictions  and  what  is  observed  in  terms  of  real   94 
contract forms. The former tend to be much more complex than the latter. 
Factors such as merit pay, group incentives, career concerns, and the  
 
 
possible role of professional cultures, norms and ethics only exacerbate this 
mismatch (Dixit 1997, 2001; Wilson 1989). 
 
With few exceptions (e.g. Ablo and Reinikka 1998; Fisman and Gatti 2000; 
Svensson 2003), empirical analysis of corruption has often been based on 
cross-country perception data. This analysis has focused on a wide range 
of factors:  
  Including legal systems,  
  Socio-economic development,  
  Political rights and democracy,  
  Ethnic composition,  
  Dimensions and degrees of decentralization,  
  Political instability,  
  Openness to trade, and  
  Public  sector  salaries  and  recruitment  policies  (for  a  review,  see 
Andvig and Fjelstad (2001)). Of particular interest to us here is the 
work of Van Rijkeghem and Weder (2001) who find that, although 
higher public servant salaries (relative to manufacturing wages) are 
associated with less corruption, those salaries would have to increase 
dramatically to eradicate corrupt behaviour.  
Using  alternative  measures  of  public  sector  earnings,  neither  Treisman 
(2000)  nor  Rauch  and  Evans  (2000)  identify  an  effect  on  perceived 
corruption.  Moreover,  Rauch  and  Evans  (2000)  find  that  employment 
security  and  recruitment  and  promotion  criteria  may  be  of  greater   95 
importance.  While  interesting,  these  analyses  have  been  subject  to 
criticism on account of the unsatisfactory measurement of corruption and 




From the literature we identified possible causes of corruption:  
(i)  Poor public servant pay;  
(ii)  The monitorability and sanctionability of public servants and the 
interests of those charged with monitoring and sanctioning;  
 
  Two hypotheses relate to the effect of poor public servant pay. 
The results suggest that public servants who receive a higher 
wage  expropriate  less.  However,  in  accordance  with  the 
findings  of  Van  Rijckeghem  and  Weder  (2001),  the  effect  is 
small; a 200% increase in wages leads to only a 30% reduction 
in  resource  expropriation.  Monitors  put  more  effort  into 
exposing expropriation by public servants who are receiving a 
higher  wage.  This  corroborates  Abbink￿s  (2002a)  observation 
that distributive fairness considerations cause well-paid public 
officials to behave less corruptly. 
  Turning  to  the  hypotheses  relating  to  the  institutional 
environment  of  monitoring,  Azfar  and  Nelson￿s  (2002)  found 
that  public  servants  expropriate  fewer  resources  when  faced 
with community representative monitors; and monitors who are 
elected representatives put greater effort into monitoring public 
servants.    96 
  It was found that public servants expropriate fewer resources 
when observability is higher; and that community members re-
elect  monitors  who  put  more  effort  (money)  into  exposing 
expropriation.  What  the  results  cannot  tell  us  is  how 
observability  might  decline  as  we  move  from  professional  to 
community representative monitoring due to the change in the 
capacity to monitor in real contexts. This notwithstanding, the 
strength of the ￿democracy effect￿ is worthy of note by those 
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Jamaica And ZERO BASED BUDGETING 
 
 
Many commentators have been suggesting for the developing country 
called Jamaica, GOVERNMENT ZERO BASED BUDGETING, what are the 
pros and cons? 
 
In addition to saving money and improving services, zero-based budgeting 
may: 
1. Increase restraint in developing budgets; 
2. Reduce the entitlement mentality with respect to cost increases; and 
3. Make budget discussions more meaningful during review sessions. 
 
On the cost side of the equation, zero-based budgeting: 
1. May increase the time and expense of preparing a budget; 
2. May be too radical a solution for the task at hand. You don￿t need a 
sledgehammer to pound in a nail; 
3. Can make matters worse if not done in the right way. A substantial 
commitment must be made by all involved to ensure that this doesn￿t 
happen.  
 
First, the success of such a change like this hinges strongly on leadership 
that is dedicated to the task. If those appointed to conduct budget reviews 
are unwilling to truly assess every item in their budget, word will get out 
quickly  that  this  new  budgeting  technique  is  more  symbolism  than 
substance.   98 
 
Second, don￿t attempt to do zero-based budgeting for every department, 
every  year.  Such  a  move  may  prove  impossible  to  manage.  Instead,  
choose  several  departments  and/or  agencies,  and  rotate  through  every 
facet of state government over time. 
Third, ensure that each review is conducted by referencing all aspects of a 
department, agency or program to what its goals are. This makes the very 
purpose  of  the  entity  being  reviewed  transparent,  and  can  increase  the 
opportunities  available  for  making  objective  measurements  of  a 
department, agency or program￿s success rate.  
As with most programs or reforms of programs, it must be done right, or it 
should not be done at all. For example, department, agency or program 
directors who feel endangered by this kind of scrutiny will be delighted to 
be placed in charge, so that they can do it wrong, waste everyone￿s time, 
and give a cutting-edge management tool like zero-based budgeting a bad 
name, all at the same time.  